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Abstract 
This article summarizes some propositions regarding economic dynamics and implications of 
two-way altruism, on the basis of the human-capital-based OLG model of Ehrlich and Lui 
(1991) and Ehrlich and Kim (2007) with application of a modified, fertility-endogenized 
definition of linearly separable two-way altruism examined by Abel (1987) and Altig and 
Davis (1993). Some properties in both a transition process and a steady state, and the effect 
of unfunded social security on an equilibrium path are also discussed. My calibration results 
and analyses show that (1) the combination of altruism toward parents and children is 
crucial for determining a threshold level of initial human capital and productivity in a 
transition process (stagnant to growth or growth to stagnant), and the generation’s attained 
utility, (2) dynamic consistency might not necessarily be the best choice to overpass the 
stumbling block against growth regime, (3) in this human-capital-based OLG model, a 
regular recursive induction approach might still cause inefficiency in terms of an ex-post 
Pareto optimality criterion as of two periods later, even if strategic effects for after children 
(two generations later) are appropriately taken account of, and (4) unfunded social security 
tax, which involves actuarially fair insurance as well as certainty premium transfer, does 
affect critical values for a regime change as well as dynamic equilibrium paths and 
corresponding subsequent life strategies, even in two-way altruistic economy.  
 
1. Introduction 
In this article, I try to extract some economic implications of “two-way altruism” in 
the context of intergenerational linkage on a human-capital-based, overlapping generation 
growth model. The primary reason why I am interested in this topic is that altruism should 
be closely related with some other forms of collaboration, teamwork or communication. Team 
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work is clearly one pattern of collusive behavior, possibly a cause for market distortion in 
microeconomic context, however, can be surely a growth engine in a dynamic context by 
means of caring about marginal effects for others’ physical/human capital accumulation. 
Communication, in often cases, is discussed from the viewpoint of Bayesian inference as a 
spontaneous process of transporting information, a surer predictor (posterior distribution) 
regarding uncertain productivity of technology. In these regards, “altruism”, in either static 
or dynamic, certain or uncertain framework, seems to give a full incentive for these 
collaborations, by offering an economic motivation to internalize any consumption/capital 
externalities, if exist, from other families and to overpass a “stumbling block” for a more 
efficient allocation over a horizontal/vertical time horizon.  
  Turning our eyes to human capital perspectives, “human capital is knowledge 
embodied in people” as Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) already point out, and the 
transfer of knowledge can be regarded genuinely as one of various forms of communication. 
On the other hand, human capital (knowledge) holds clearly different economic attributes 
from ordinary physical capital, for example “a rising rate of return (Becker et al. (1990))”, 
irreversibility as seen in most other aspects of “information”, absence of intra-family market 
& pricing (although inter-family market & pricing may exist as an education/information 
industry), inter/intra family investment (transfer/accumulation) only through time 
allocation, trade-off between quality (human capital) and quantity (fertility), or etc. In 
addition, in a physical-capital-based dynasty model, it is rather clear, simply by comparing F. 
O. C.’s, that holding altruism toward parents as well as one toward children is, if 
appropriately taken, helpful for improving dynamic efficiency. Therefore I focus on the role 
of two-way altruism in a typical human-capital-based OLG model especially as an 
internalization of various externalities, which all the above peculiar attributes of human 
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capital bring about.   
To see the reasons why two-way altruism assumption is crucial in a typical OLG 
model, assume the OLG model consisting of three life stages (childhood, young adulthood 
(middle age) and old adulthood (retirement stage)). One generation, in order to determine its 
own life strategies, including number of children and human capital investment per child, in 
a recursive induction at the beginning of young adulthood (period t ) , needs to specify the 
way for linkage with at least one of its adjacent generations, forward or backward, which 
determines the amount of intergenerational transfer. However, in general, these linkages 
( l  and 'l  as defined later) cannot be left for a spontaneous bargaining mechanism 
between these two generations, simply because a positive utility gain from a positive 
transfer for one generation implies a negative utility gain for another generation. Even if 
some intergenerational risk sharing mechanism with no social/market insurance available 
is considered between young and old adulthood, in which bequest (from parents to children) 
and compensation (vice versa) correspond with each revelation of mortality/income risks, the 
mortality risk of parental generation generates a peculiar shape of its indifference curve, 
and this shape makes it for both parents and children impossible to set initially some value 
for the state contingent claim between two states of mortality risk, or equivalently to set the 
initial relative price between bequest and compensation. This is a totally different point 
from Arrow-Debreu state-contingent exchange economy, in which state contingent claim (or 
state price) enables them to arrive at a market-clearing and Pareto optimal equilibrium. As 
a consequence, in this short-run bargaining frame work, an automatic price adjustment 
process to a unique equilibrium point cannot be expected, as far as any additional 
restrictions (e.g., regarding the marginal rate of substitution between bequest and 
compensation, or the proportion in the marginal utility of transfer) are not introduced, or a 
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fixed level of (almost actuarially fair) social/market insurance is not available for old 
parents.1 
Therefore I assume that fixed altruistic weights (proportions) of utilities between 
neighbor generations are exogenously given as a kind of social norm, although they may be 
variable in the long run. Consider the following forward altruistic utility of generation 
(vintage) t : 
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Here { })( 1)( otytt uuu ++º d , )( ytu  and )( 1otu +  are the whole life, young and old adulthood utility 
of generation t , respectively. d  is a time preference discount factor for old (retirement) 
stage, and l  is a weight of altruism toward children (next generation 1+t ). Then 
generation t  decides its life strategies at the beginning of period t , so that they might 
maximize its (altruistic) utility, while consequently the next generation 1+t  faces an 
implicit restriction parental generation imposed regarding the ratio in marginal utility of 
intergenerational transfer (bequest/compensation) between )( 1otu +  and )( 1ytu + . In other words, 
the generation holds, in general, two chances of intergenerational linkage, firstly through 
fertility and human capital investment decision during young adulthood, and secondly 
through transfer (compensation/bequest) during old stage. Therefore, next generation 1+t  
is required, at the beginning of M  (period 1+t ), to take this implicit restriction as given, 
or to internalize it by adding an old adulthood utility part )( 1otu +  of parental generation t  
weighted by some altruistic coefficient. Thus two-way altruistic utility of the following form 
makes sense, so that it enables the recursive computation of value function without 
                                                   
1 These are typical economic features of intergenerational risk sharing, as described in Aoki (2007). 
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intergenerational bargaining confliction: 
1
)(
1
)()(
1
)( }{'' +++ +++=++= totytotttott uuuuuuuV ldlll  (1.2) 
Since, as a natural result, this form, which ranges at least two (actually three in this case) 
adjacent periods, contains a utility part of next generation )( 2)( 11 otytt uuu +++ += d  and its own 
old adulthood utility part )( 1otu + , the generation maximizes (1.2), taking account of 
subsequent effects its own life strategies brings on the next generation. While this (or a 
similar) form of two-way altruism is examined by Abel (1985), Kimball (1987) or Altig and 
Steve (1991) basically from the viewpoints of steady states, they do not pay much 
consideration to the timing of determination of life strategies, as well as a rebound and 
indirect effect on its old age utility through next generation’s strategy setting. In addition, if 
the generation is dynamically consistent in the sense that it behaves as parents expected in 
terms of transfer motive during old (retirement) stage, it must hold that ldl /'= , which 
implies that the generation, who holds less altruism toward children, should be more 
altruistic toward parents. However, in general, there is no guarantee that each generation 
holds a dynamically consistent altruism toward its parental generation, or that above all 
dynamic consistency leads to dynamic efficiency, especially where the economy is not in a 
steady state. On the other hand, from socio-biological point of view, it is quite natural to 
assume ldl =' instead, because an egoistic person is normally egoistic both for parents and 
children, therefore tends to hold smaller 'l  as smallerl  is. Thus the dynamic consistency 
is a concept somewhat contrary to our intuition in socio-biological context. Therefore, in this 
article, I am going to summarize some propositions and features regarding economic 
dynamics and implications of two-way altruism, being careful enough for these crucial 
aspects, specification of intergenerational linkage, timing of strategy determination and 
 7 
indirect strategic effects, effects of dynamic consistency/inconsistency and steady/unsteady 
states, and in addition, roles of mandatory intergenerational transfer between old parents 
and young adulthood as implemented in the form of unfunded social security. This is exactly 
the objective of this article. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Becker (1976) is the first article, which developed a powerful analysis by joining the 
individual rationality of the economist to the group rationality of the socio-biologist, and 
showed that the models of genetic group selection are unnecessary, since altruistic behavior 
can be selected as a consequence of individual rationality. Becker and Murphy (1988) try to 
understand the widespread intervention by governments in families, concluding that many 
public actions achieve more efficient arrangements between parents and children. Becker, 
Murphy and Tamura (1990) analyze a growth model which assumes endogenous fertility 
and a rising rate of return on human capital, and derive two stable steady states, of which 
one has large families and little human capital, and the other has small families and 
perhaps growing human and physical capital. Becker and Barro (1988) develops an 
economic analysis of the linkages in fertility rates and capital accumulation across 
generations, considering the determination of fertility and capital accumulation in each 
generation when wage rates and interest rates are parameters to each family and to open 
econonmies. Ehrlich and Lui (1991) develop an overlapping generation model in which 
human capital is an endogenous engine of growth and the generations are linked through 
material interdependency as an implicit contract, as well as through emotional 
“companionship”. They succeed in extracting some typical economic features, which might 
be possibly observed in a real OLG economy both in a steady state and in a (demographic) 
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transition process, for example, showing that an increase in young-age longevity is likely to 
produce a greater increase in the growth rate and a reduction in the fertility rate, while 
population aging may also raise the growth rate. Ehrlich and Kim (2005) develop a dynamic 
model of endogenous fertility, longevity, and human capital formation within a Malthusian 
framework that allows for diminishing returns to labor but also for the role of human capital 
as an engine of growth. Their model accounts for economic stagnation with high fertility and 
mortality and constant population and income, as predicted by Malthus, but also for takeoffs 
to a growth regime and a demographic transition toward low fertility and mortality rates, 
and a persistent growth in per-capita income. Ehrlich (1990) and Ehrlich and Lui (1997) 
respectively offer thorough and sophisticated surveys of population and growth literatures 
as of the time the article was written. Lucas (1988) considers the prospects for constructing 
a neoclassical theory of growth and international trade that is consistent with some of the 
main features of economic development. Three models are considered and compared to 
evidence: a model emphasizing physical capital accumulation and technological change, a 
model emphasizing human capital accumulation through schooling, and a model 
emphasizing specialized human capital accumulation through learning-by-doing.  
Cigno and Rosati (1996) derive some comparative-statistics predictions of models of 
the joint determination of household saving and fertility under various hypotheses 
(self-interest, altruism of parents towards children, altruism of children towards parents, 
etc.) and compare them with those of models which determine saving under the assumption 
of exogenous fertility. Boldrin, De Nardi and Jones (2005) explore the type of model, which is 
consistent with the data showing that an increase in government provided old-age pensions 
is strongly correlated with a reduction in fertility, using the one by Barro and Becker (1988) 
and the other inspired by Caldwell and developed by Boldrin and Jones (2002). Abel (1987) 
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determines conditions under which each of the intergenerational transfer motives is 
operative if individual consumers have two-sided transfer motives. Altig and Steve (1991) 
develop the implications of borrowing constraints and two sided altruism in an overlapping 
generations framework with agents who lived three periods. Six equilibrium patterns of 
inter-temporal and intergenerational linkage in the no-loan economy, one of which 
corresponds to the traditional life-cycle model, and one of which corresponds to Barro’s 
dynastic model. Novel linkage patterns involve parent-to-child transfers early in the life 
cycle, child-to-parent gifts late in the life cycle, or both. Kimball (1987) analyzes recursive 
dependence of altruistic utility on the utility of both children and parents, and shows that 
dynamic inefficiency cannot be ruled out even in the presence of two-sided altruism, 
especially in the unsteady state. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) offer a standard textbook of 
international macroeconomics, which contains the description of typical overlapping 
generation models, and learning-by-doing externality in AK model. Raut (2006) extends the 
Samuelsonian overlapping generation general equilibrium framework to encompass a 
variety of altruistic preferences by recasting it into a Lindahl equilibrium framework. Here 
a complete characterization of Pareto optimal allocation is provided using the Lindahl 
equilibrium prices. Zhang, Zhang and Lee (2001) examine the impacts of mortality decline 
on long-run growth in a dynastic family, two-sector growth model with social security. A rise 
in longevity has direct effects on fertility, human capital investment, and growth, as well as 
indirect effects through unfunded social security contributions. Blackburn and Cipriani 
(2005) present an analysis of demographic transition based on the endogenous evolution of 
intergenerational transfers along an economy’s endogenous path of development. 
Aoki (2007) describes, within a myopic intergenerational bargaining framework 
incorporating two discrete periods and binary states of risks, some new aspects regarding 
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the mixture of intergenerational risk sharing and social security. Here, state-dependent 
utility under mortality risk proves to generate parents’ peculiar indifference curve regarding 
insurance contract, and self-insurance is shown to play a crucial role on the decision 
regarding social security holding and intergenerational transfer contract. Abel (1985) 
develops a general equilibrium model of precautionary saving and accidental bequests to 
analyze the implications of individual lifetime uncertainty for aggregate consumption and 
capital accumulation, and shows that, in the absence of a private annuity market, the 
introduction of actuarially fair Social Security crowds out private wealth by more than one 
for one, thereby reducing national wealth. Kohara and Ohtake (2006) analyze what adult 
children would do for their parents were they frail and in need of long-term care. They show 
that children provide parental care when their parents are wealthy enough to meet the costs 
of nursing, and that this parental care is not motivated entirely by altruism. Iwamoto (2006) 
examines, both in detail and with sophistication, the scheme of social security financing in 
Japan that will be sustainable under the coming population aging process, in which he 
claims that public pension should be a mixture of the pay-as-you-go system and the fully 
funded system. Nishimura and Zhang (1995) analyze two largely hypothetical social security 
systems that condition payments on individual fertility, as well as a conventional system 
that does not condition payments on fertility, and prove that, under the social security 
systems that relate payments to individual fertility, and equilibrium will converge to a 
sustainable steady state. Nishimura and Zhang (1992) show, in the generalized Veall’s 
model of public pension, that gifts to the old, which can be viewed as social security 
contributions, are always positive in the steady states, that an optimal allocation, not 
sustainable in general, is sustainable if savings are zero and fertility is exogenous, and that, 
if a government enforces a social security plan setting the pension level at the optimal gifts 
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and individuals optimize under the pension constraint, the resulting sustainable outcome is 
in general different from either the optimal or Nash outcome. Benhabib and Nishimura 
(1989) analyze one of the interesting hypothesis of population growth suggesting the 
possibility of self-generating fluctuations in population growth, using the Barro-Becker 
model, and show that under a broad class of preferences, fertility and per-capita incomes not 
only move together but endogenously oscillate.  
Among the above literatures, the first serious economic study on altruism and on 
human-capital based overlapping generation model originate in Becker (1976) and Ehrlich 
and Lui (1991), respectively. Some arguments regarding dynamic consistency, 
intergenerational transfer motives and funded/unfunded social security under two-sided 
altruism appear, for example, in Abel (1987) or Altig and Steve (1991). 
 
3. Model & Methodology 
In principle, I adopt the same model settings and the same notations, as constructed 
in Ehrlich and Lui (1991), and Ehrlich and Kim (2005). The model assumes three stages in 
one generation’s whole life, childhood, young and old adulthood, and adjacent generations 
(parents and children) sharing the same period t  within adjacent life stages respectively. 
Young adult determines, at the beginning, some life strategies, fertility (the number of 
children per parent) tn , human capital investment for each child th , and compensation 
rate 1+tw , which is to be given by their children in the next period as old age support, and 
saving rate ts . Here I examine the simplest case in which (1) there exists only one 
representative (identical) family, (2) there do not exist any inter/intra-generational 
human-capital externalities from outside families, and (3) there is no weight of 
companionship toward children: 
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ss --º 1))1/(1()( ccu : a utility where s  represents the inverse value of the 
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution or the constant relative risk aversion coefficient. t : 
Period t . y , o : young/old adulthood, children. tN : Number of couple (young adult) at 
period t . tn : Number of children (fertility) the generation t  bears per parent. ty : 
Production by generation t . tH : Acquired human capital. H : Raw labor capital. 
(Therefore, HH t +  represents total production capacity.) 1~ -tS : Total saving. th : Time 
allocation a parent (young adult) devotes to educate each child. v : Allocation of labor time a 
parent (young adult) devotes to raise each child. ts : A fraction of income 
)( HH tt +h allocated to saving during young adulthood. rV , : Time efficiency for 
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4 Since there is no restriction imposed in 1+tw  here, 1+tw  can be negative, in other words, parents 
could transfer a positive amount of bequests to children, instead of receiving compensation (gift) from 
them. This case matters especially under the assumption of saving habit ( 0>ts ). 
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intra-family education and saving. tw : Compensation rate from a young adult (a child) to 
an old adult (a parent). th : Wage for a unit of human capital (production capacity).5 tc ,1 : 
Young adulthood at period t .  1,2 +tc : Old adulthood consumption at period 1+t . tu : Whole 
life utility (of both young and old adulthood) of generation t . )( ytu : Young-adulthood utility 
of the generation at period t . )(otu : Old-adulthood utility of parental generation 
(vintage 1-t ). 1p , 2p : Survival rate to young and old adulthood, respectively. B : Weight of 
companionship toward children. D : Rate of return in saving. 
 
To make the analyses the simplest possible, I adopt in this article the following additively 
separable form of two-way altruism, which incorporates fertility decisions and covers all the 
relevant utilities of two adjacent generations during two adjacent periods: 
)()(ˆ)}()({)()('ˆ
)(ˆ)('ˆ
1,11,22,1,21
)(
1
)(
1
++-
+-
+++=
++=
tttttt
y
ttt
o
ttt
cuncucucun
unuunV
ldpl
ll    (3.6) 6 
Here )( ,1)( tyt cuu º , )( 1,2)( 1 ++ º tot cuu , )( 12)( otytt uuu ++º dp , ttt nnan )()(ˆ 1lpl º , 
111
2
1 )(
')('ˆ
--
- º
tt
t nnan p
dpll , and e-º nna )( )10( ££ e . 7  )0(>l , )0(' >l and e  
respectively denote the degree of pure altruism toward children, toward parents, and the 
constant elasticity of altruism per child as their number increases.8 Dynamic consistency 
requires the condition 1'=ll , while socio-biological consistency does 'll = , but I do not 
                                                   
5 With linear production function ( 1=g ), 0.1=th . 
6 Another candidate is, for example, 1)(1 )(ˆ)('ˆ +- ++= tttottt unuunV ll  (3.6a). 
7 The elasticity of altruism per child (e ) was introduced by Becker et al. (1990). 0.1=e denotes 
perfect inelasticity of altruism with number of child. 
8 Unlike ordinary time preference, I do not exclude the possibility of 1³l , because parents are, 
sometimes as an important case, very likely to put more weight in children than in themselves.  
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impose these conditions as a general restriction. Also, define an “altruistic” economy as 
1'>ll  and an “egoistic” one as 1'<ll . Assume that, throughout this article, time is finite 
and ends at Tt = . Then generation t  solves: 
{ } { }( ))( 1)(1,,,,,,11 )(ˆ)('ˆmaxmax)~,,(~ ytttottsnhtsnhtttt unuunVSnHV tttttttt +--- ++== llww   (3.7) 
Steady states can be defined as a set of life strategies{ }+¥-¥=ttttt snh w,,, , which satisfies the 
equilibrium conditions, and in addition: 
0³= hht , 0³= nnt , 0³= sst  and ww =t  for all t .  
Here there exist two types of steady states, a stagnant equilibrium for 0/1 ³> hA  and a 
growth equilibrium for Ah /1³ , as analyzed in Becker et al. (1988) and Ehrlich et al. (1991). 
In a stagnant equilibrium, 11,1,1 ccc tt º= + , 21,2,2 ccc tt º= +  and 
HAhHAhHH tt º-== + )1/(1 . 9  On the other hand, in a growth 
equilibrium, tt AhHH =+1  ( HH t >> ), 1,11,1 AhcAhcc tt º=+ , 2,21,2 AhcAhcc tt º=+ . At 
first I assume, for simplicity, condition (x): 121 == pp , 1== Vr , 1=g (linear 
technology) and 10 ££ e . 
 
4.  Case A-Saving but no compensation economy 
At first, I consider the benchmark case (case A hereafter), in which an old adulthood 
generation can make use of only its own saving, not compensation from the next generation. 
In this case, it is easily seen that each generation keeps an intergenerational linkage with 
subsequent generations only in its young adulthood only through human capital investment 
and fertility decision for children, not through any other channels, therefore the problem of 
                                                   
9 Therefore, )1/( AhHHH -=+ . 
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dynamic inconsistency does not occur. Specifically generation t  solves the following 
problem. 
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Clearly this value function can be divided into two additively separable parts: 
)~,()()~,,(~ 1111 ---- += tttttttt SnfHVSnHV
     (4.2) 
As a consequence, the life strategies ),,( ttt snh of generation t  depend at most only on its 
own human capital tH , not on fertility or saving decision ( 1-tn  or 1~ -tS ) of parental 
generation 1-t , so that  )( ttt Hhh = , )( ttt Hnn = , and )( ttt Hss = , and the above 
maximization problem involves taking account of strategic effects on next generations’ life 
strategies, )( 111 +++ = ttt Hhh , )( 111 +++ = ttt Hnn  and )( 111 +++ = ttt Hss . Then the first order 
conditions are:  
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with equality if 01 >+tH  ( 0>th ). 
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Here we have 0/ 1 <¶¶ +tt sV , 0/ 1 <¶¶ +tt nV , 0/ 2 <¶¶ +tt HV . Equilibrium conditions in 
stagnant/growth steady states for case A, as well as for case B, are described in Appendix 1. 
Proposition 4-1:  The degree of backward altruism toward its parental generation 'l  does 
not affect the generation’s own life strategies, whether it is dynamically consistent or not. 
Proposition 4-2: Assume 0.1=e , in which the generation holds perfectly inelastic altruism 
with number of child. Then the fertility is always at the minimum level possible ( minnnt = , 
say), regardless of 1>l , 1=l  or 1<l . 
 
It is noteworthy that, in a dynastic framework, fertility has an interior solution for 1<l  
even with 0.1=e , while 1>l  is shown to may have a corner solution for fertility decision, 
either minn  or maxn . 10  In saving but no-compensation economy, dynamic 
consistency/inconsistency does not matter and there do not exist any internalizable 
(positive/negative) externalities from the economic environment generated by parental 
                                                   
10 This is derived from (A2.4-c) and (A2.4-e). 
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generation, relative population 1/1 -tn , human capital 1-tH  and saving 1~ -tS .  
Proposition 4-3: Life strategies of one generation t  ( tn , th , ts ) depend only on its own 
human capital tH . Especially, in a growth regime ( HH t >> , Aht /1> ), tH  (or any 
small shock in tH ) does not affect tn , th  or ts . In other words, the economy is always in 
(growth) equilibrium.11 
 
Now I show computation results for some parameter values, using programs for 
recursive dynamic computation. Set the values at 5.0=s , 5.0=e , 5.0=d , 0.2=D , 
1.0=v , 0.1=H  (Raw human capital).12 Also hereafter, for the convenience of calibration, 
I limit the values of life strategies chosen, as following: 13 14 
maxmin 0.10 hhh t =££= , maxmin 5.00 sss t =££= , maxmin 25.0 nnn t =££= 15 
and maxmin 5.05.0 www =££-= t (only in case B and C)  (4.4) 
In order to compare the attained welfare for differentl ’s, I define a normalized value 
function as )1/()(~)(
~~ l+º tttt HVHV . Assume that the generation is now at 1=t , and that 
time ends at Tt = .16 Table 1 plots, with 3=T , the transition paths of life strategies for 
case (i) 5.0=l  and (ii) 0.2=l , for some combinations of A  and 1H , (a) 5=A  and 1H  
                                                   
11 Therefore 0/ =¶¶ tt Hs , 0/ =¶¶ tt Hn  and 0/ =¶¶ tt Hh  ( 0/1 ¹@¶¶ + ttt AhHH ). 
12 0.1=Dd  implies a constant consumption habit under a regular representative agents’ utility. 
13 1=tn  implies that the generation bears 2 children per couple. 
14 Throughout this paper I adopt the weighted calibration windows for tH  and 1~ -tS , in which they 
are partitioned equally at the same interval for the low level around H , but with smoothly broader 
intervals for the higher region ( HSH tt >>-1~, ). The calibration results described in Table 1-4 are 
trivially different from those in the previous version, partly because of these modified window settings 
and partly because of some input error in the candidate values of fertility choice. 
15 In reality tn  takes some discrete values, 0, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5 and 2.0. 
16 This assumption is set in order to make the calibration possible and the economy fit well in reality. 
For convenience, I set TT hh =+1 , TT nn =+1 , TT ss =+1  (and TT ww =+1 ). 
 18 
is moving at 0.5, 1.5 and 2.5, (b) 01 =H  and A  is moving at 2.5, 5.0, 7.5 and 10.0, and (c) 
101 =H  and A  is moving at 1.0, 2.0, 3.0 and 4.0.  
Also I search out the following critical values, important indices of transition process for 
another terminal period 3=T .   
­
=51AH : Critical value of initial human capital 1H , which makes the economy pushed up into 
a growth state, when the productivity coefficient is at 5=A  ( ­ =¯ = << 010 11 HH AAA ).17 
­
=01HA : Critical value of productivity coefficient A , which makes the economy pushed up into 
a growth state, when the initial human capital is the lowest at 101 =<<= HH . 
¯
=101HA : Critical value of A , which makes the economy trapped into a stagnant state, when 
the initial human capital is relatively high at 1101 =>>= HH . 
 
Here I assume that the economy is eventually in a growth regime, 
when }5,max{ 1)3( HHHT ³= . These critical values are shown in Table 3, together those 
with case B. It is intuitive that more altruism toward children ((ii) 12 >=l ) generates a 
lower threshold in either of these three criteria ( ­=51AH , ­ =01HA  and ¯ =101HA ). On the other 
hand, we observe that ­ =¯ = < 010 11 HH AA , that is, the threshold level of productivity from 
stagnant to growth regime is higher than that for keeping growth regime, which is a typical 
hysteresis aspect of transition process.18 19 Also the existence of ­=51AH  for (i) ( 15.0 <=l ) 
                                                   
17 ¯=
­
= = 5151 AA HH . 5=A  is taken here, because this value is situated in an intermediate region 
between unconditional growth regime and unconditional stagnant regime. 
18  This hysteresis aspect can be observed also for 10=T . Clearly it is a more conspicuous 
phenomenon in this two-way altruistic framework than in (altruistic) dynasty model. 
19 One intuitive explanation is as follows. Defining total human capital HHH tt +º~ , the effective 
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is one typical feature of “Malthusian trap”, in which the lower initial human capital relative 
to raw human capital H  could be a main stumbling block into a growth regime even with 
the same productivity coefficient. In Table 1, we see that, in less altruism toward children 
((i) 5.0=l ), a regime change from stagnant to growth state occurs more drastically, as 
initial human capital or productivity coefficient increase, while, in more altruism toward 
children ((ii) 12 >=l ), this regime change happens more gradually, but more steadily. In 
(ii) with an intermediate productivity ((a) 5=A ) and lower initial human capital, human 
capital investment th  is small at first and increasing as time passes, if T  is finite and 
small. (For example, 02.01 =h , 3.02 =h  and 74.03 =h  for 3=T  and 5.01 =H .) In 
addition, with relatively lower initial human capital and intermediate productivity 
coefficient in a quasi-growth regime, more altruism toward children (ii) proves to be an 
accelerating factor of growth in comparison with (i). The calibration results in Table 1 
confirm that in a growth regime fertility is low, while in a stagnant regime it is high, and 
this aspect also holds in either Case B (Table 2) or C. As far as the attained utility are 
concerned, (ii) is better than (i) in value function )(~ tt HV , but worse in normalized value 
function )(~~ tt HV  for all the parameter settings ((a), (b) and (c)). 
In a growth regime where HH t >>+1 and Aht /11 >+ , it holds that 0/ 11 =¶¶ ++ tt Hs , 
0/ 11 =¶¶ ++ tt Hn , 0/ 112 ¹@¶¶ +++ ttt AhHH  (Proposition 4-3), and 
}/){(')(/ 11,112 AncunHV ttttt ++-+ -=¶¶ el . Therefore: 
                                                                                                                                                     
return in human capital investment is )/(~/~ 1 HHHAhHH tttt ++=+ . Then ttt AhHH @+ ~/~ 1  
for HH t >> , bur ttttt AhHHHAhHH >++@+ )/(~/~ 1  for HH t @ . For example, 
1~/~ 1 @+ tt HH  even for 0=th , so even if productivity coefficient A  is relatively high, 0=th  
might be still possibly optimal in a stagnant state. 
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Then effective altruism toward parents is defined as:20 
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In case A, the economy happens to be effectively in dynamic consistency, only if:  
1}1{
)( 11 @---
-
-
tttt
m
t
snhvnA
sDm       (4.7) 
 
5. Case B-Compensation but no saving economy 
Next I consider the alternative case (case B hereafter), in which an old adulthood 
generation can make use of only compensation (old-age support) from the next generation. 
In this case, each generation not only keeps one intergenerational linkage with subsequent 
generations in its young adulthood through fertility decision and human capital investment 
for children, but also another in its old adulthood through implicit compensation contract, 
therefore there does exist a possibility of dynamic inconsistency. Specifically generation t  
solves the following problem: 
                                                   
20 The definition of '~l , ))('/())(')(('~ ,2,11 ttt cucun dl e--º , is derived from the first order condition 
of compensation scheme (case B). See (5.2). 
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s.t. 
ttt hHHAH ][1 +=+ , ),( 111 tttt nHhh +++ = , ),( 111 tttt nHnn +++ = , ),( 111 tttt nH +++ = ww  
Also, in order to compare the attained welfare for different l ’s and 'l ’s, I define a 
normalized value function as )'1/(),(~),(
~~
11 ll ++º -- tttttt nHVnHV . Then the first order 
conditions are: 
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with equality if 01 >+tH  ( 0>th ). 
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with equality if 0>tn .   (5.2) 
 
Here we have 0/ 1 >¶¶ +ttV w , 0< , 0= , if 1'<ll , 1> , 1= , respectively. Furthermore, 
0/ 1 <¶¶ +tt nV  and 0/ 2 <¶¶ +tt HV . th , tn  and tw  are not affected, unlike in case A, by 
the value of tH , but are the functions only of 1-tn , if HH t >> , probably in a growth state, 
while tH  matters, if HH t @  or HH t £ , probably in a stagnant state. In the latter 
case, the relative value of tH  on )1(=H  is a crucial determinant, in the forthcoming 
transition process, to overpass a stumbling block to a growth state, or to go down into a 
Malthusian trap. In order to enable the analysis with a clear contrast, I consider the 
following four combinations of coefficients of altruism toward children and parents, )',( ll . 
Case I: )0.2,5.0()',( =ll  ( .0.1'=ll Less altruistic toward children, but more altruistic 
toward parents. Dynamically consistent.) 
Case II: )5.0,5.0()',( =ll  ( 125.0' <=ll . (Egoistic economy) Less altruistic toward both 
children and parents. Dynamically inconsistent.) 
Case III: )5.0,0.2()',( =ll  ( .0.1'=ll Less altruistic toward children, but more altruistic 
toward parents. Dynamically consistent.) 
Case IV: )0.2,0.2()',( =ll  ( 14' >=ll . (Altruistic economy) More altruistic toward both 
children and parents. Dynamically inconsistent.) 
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I set the same parameter values and calibration conditions, and in addition, 10 =n . The 
generation is now at 1=t , and time ends at 10== Tt . Table 2 plots the transition paths 
of life strategies for case I, II, III and IV, for the same combinations of A  and 1H  as 
adopted in case A, (a) 5=A  and 1H  is moving at 0.5, 1.5 and 2.5, (b) 01 =H  and A  is 
moving at 2.5, 5.0, 7.5 and 10.0, and (c) 101 =H  and A  is moving at 1.0, 2.0, 3.0 and 4.0. 
In I, II, III and IV of case B of Table 3, we observe, as in case A, that ­ =¯ = < 010 11 HH AA , a 
hysteresis aspect of transition process, and the existence of )0(51 >­=AH  for 1<l , one 
feature of “Malthusian trap”. Other features are summarized as follows. (1) More altruism 
toward children (III or IV, 1>l ) generates a lower threshold of initial human capital from 
stagnant to growth state, than less altruism toward children (I or II, 1<l ). (2) In 1<l  (I or 
II), dynamic consistency (I) generates a lower threshold of initial human capital, but a 
higher threshold of productivity from stagnant to growth state, than dynamic inconsistency 
& egoism (II) (3) dynamic consistency (I or III) generates a higher threshold of productivity 
for keeping growth state, than dynamic inconsistency (II or IV), (4) Less altruism toward 
parents (II or III, 1'<l ) generates a higher threshold of productivity, from stagnant to 
growth state, than more altruism toward parents (I or IV, 1'>l ). From Table 2, it is not so 
straightforward to conclude which combination (I, II, III or Iv) is better or worse, but 
roughly speaking, the following features are summarized: (1) Dynamic consistency (I or III, 
1'=ll ) does not necessarily attain a better growth path than inconsistent case in every 
parameter setting of initial human capital 1H  and productivity A . (2) The egoistic 
economy (II, 5.0'== ll ) exhibits, in comparison with case I (dynamically 
consistent, 0.2',5.0 == ll ), a drastic regime change from stagnant to growth state as 
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initial human capital or productivity are increasing, while, in the altruistic economy (IV, 
2'== ll ), this regime change happens very gradually and steadily. (3) In more altruism 
toward children (III or IV, 12 >=l ) under a quasi-growth regime, especially in the 
altruistic economy (IV), human capital investment th  is non zero but relatively low at first 
( 1=t ), and gradually increasing as the terminal period T  comes near. 
From some of the above results: 
)()( 5151 IIIHIH AA ­=­= > , )()( 00 11 IIIAIA HH ­ =­ = > , )()( 1010 11 IIIAIA HH ¯ =¯ = <  (Case B) 
Note that both cases, (I) and (III), are dynamically consistent )1'( =ll . From these results I 
claim the following proposition. 
Proposition 5-1: In case B with dynamic consistency )1'( =ll , the economy less altruistic 
toward children (I) holds the higher thresholds for initial human capital or productivity from 
stagnant to growth state, than the more altruistic economy (III), but a lower threshold 
productivity from growth to stagnant state.  
 
The implication of this proposition is that, for the pure purpose of eventually arriving at or 
maintaining a growth regime, the altruistic attitude toward children is preferred in an 
initially stagnant economy )( 1 HH < , but the egoistic attitude is rather preferred in an 
initially in-growth economy )( 1 HH >> . 
 
Effect of initial fertility level 0n and initial human capital 1H  
The Effect of initial fertility level 0n  depends on the values of s  and e . If se > , lower 
initial fertility (small 0n ) induces lower compensation rate 1w , and through a positive 
income effect induces larger investment for human capital and fertility ( 1h  and 1n ), being 
an accelerating factor of growth, while larger initial fertility might be an impediment 
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against growth. And vice versa if se < . Instead, if se = , then any shock in 0n  is 
neutralized (canceled off) and does not affect the life strategies of generation 1 ( 1h , 1n  
and 1w ). As for the effect of initial human capital 1H , the same property holds, in which it 
does not affect the subsequent life strategies under a growth regime. Summarizing the 
above, I have the following proposition as an analogy of proposition 4-3. 
Proposition 5-2:  
If se = , then 0/ 1 =¶¶ -tt nw , 0/ 1 =¶¶ -tt nn  and 0/ 1 =¶¶ -tt nh  ( 0/ 11 =¶¶ -+ tt nH ). 
If HH t >> and Aht /1> , then 0/ =¶¶ tt Hw , 0/ =¶¶ tt Hn  and 0/ =¶¶ tt Hh  
( 0/1 ¹@¶¶ + ttt AhHH ). The economy is always in a steady state if se =  (Relative risk 
aversion coefficient is equal to elasticity of altruism per child.) and HH t >>  (a growth 
regime). 
 
Effect of dynamic inconsistency ( 1'¹ll ) 
As a matter of fact, dynamic inconsistency is not any problem as far as generation t  
predicts precisely the reaction functions of next generation, ),( 111 tttt nHhh +++ = , 
),( 111 tttt nHnn +++ =  and ),( 111 tttt nH +++ = ww , and the ex-ante efficiency is kept in the 
sense that the generation maximizes its own two-way altruistic utility, given initial human 
capital tH , initial fertility 1-tn , and the above strategic effects on next generation. 
However, some points are still to be noted. At first, as seen in (5.2), the first order condition 
of (5.1) in fertility is done for tn , not for 1+tN . This implies that (5.2) does not take account of 
the effect of its fertility decision on the welfare after 1+t . Next, see that (5.1) is equivalent 
with the following problem: 
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s.t. ),( 1'''' -= tttt nHhh , ),( 1'''' -= tttt nHnn , ),( 1'''' -= tttt nHww , ''1' ][ ttt hHHAH +=+   
( 2,1' ++= ttt ) 
This is a Bellman-equation-like-version of (5.1). This form involves the utility parts 
(parents/children) and reaction functions until period 2+t . So the internalization of the 
first order conditions within this recursive computation framework might be possibly 
incomplete whether the economy is in a steady state (or is in a transition process) or not, and 
this aspect causes somewhat inefficiency. On the other hand, from (5.1-a), it is seen how 
altruism toward parents 'l  affects value function ),(~ 1-ttt nHV , in which more 'l  
contributes in the utility part )(otu , but hurts the part )( 1otu + . As far as the above calibration 
results ((a) , (b) and (c) for Case I to IV) are concerned, more altruism either toward parents 
(larger 'l ) or toward children (largerl ) increases ),(~ 1-ttt nHV , but decreases normalized 
value function ),(
~~
1-ttt nHV .21 Between I and III (both 1'=ll ), III ( )5.0,0.2()',( =ll ) is 
better than I ( )0.2,5.0()',( =ll ) both in ),(~ 1-ttt nHV  and ),(
~~
1-ttt nHV . 
 
6.  Specification and implications of intergenerational linkage- miscellaneous issues 
Case-C: Both saving and compensation economy 
In Figure 1 I show the specification of intergenerational linkage in Case C-Both 
saving and compensation economy, as well as Case A and B. In this section, I just write down 
                                                   
21 )'1/(),(~),(
~~
11 ll ++º -- tttttt nHVnHV  
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a few comments about case C. In case C, generation t  solves the following problem: 
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s.t.  ttt hHHAH ][1 +=+ , mttt sHHDS )]([~ += , )~,,( 111 ttttt SnHhh +++ = ,  
)~,,( 111 ttttt SnHnn +++ = , )~,,( 111 ttttt SnH +++ = ww , )~,,( 111 ttttt SnHss +++ =  
Here state variables are 11
~,, -- ttt SnH  and control variables are tttt shn ,,, w . First, in this 
case, the determination of saving rate ts  crucially depends on altruism toward parents 'l , 
as well as altruism toward children l , time preference d , interest rate D , and other 
parameters like s ,e , v , H . This is a different point from Case A, in which the old age 
utility of parents and the middle age utility of children are not directly altruistically linked.  
One important aspect of case C is that compensation tw  might not necessarily be 
positive but negative (i.e., a positive bequest) even if 'l  is positive, under the existence of a 
high parental saving 1
~
-tS . This tendency is strengthened especially when the old-age 
mortality risk exists and the intergenerational transfer involves a corresponding risk 
sharing between the two adjacent generations (old and young adulthood). Reversely 
speaking, the negative expected (mean) compensation does not necessarily imply the 
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non-existence of positive altruism. On the other hand, the absence of well-functioning risk 
sharing of old-age life uncertainty with social/market insurance induces a precautionary 
saving in middle age saving 1
~
-tS , because of the necessity of self-insurance. Therefore it is a 
delicate task to estimate econometrically 'l  with a potential mixture of social/market 
insurance under continuous time mortality risk.22  
If '~l  is far different from 'l , then clearly ts  deviates from in case A.23 24 Next, 
the direct linkage between parents’ old age and children’s middle age through setting 'l  
enables the internalization of the externality from unexpected change in parents’ saving to 
some extent, and might lead to more efficiency than in case A, as far as some of these 
intergenerational linkage are not binding. However, this kind of internalization might still 
end in insufficiency, exactly because of the same reason stated in section 5 (case B). Thus an 
empirical investigation of )',( ll  with other parameters is expected to offer useful 
information for the construction of well balanced funded/unfunded social security as well as 
for the robustness against a drastic transition process. 
 
Welfare analysis-What does “efficiency” imply in this dynamic programming? 
As already stated, each generation, who solves problems (4.1) for case A, (5.1) for case B, and 
(6.1) for case C, behaves “efficiently” as far as it precisely predicts the reaction functions of 
subsequent generations, whether the life strategies are in a steady state or in a transition 
                                                   
22 In this regard, Kohara and Ohtake (2006) state that the parental care supplied by Japanese middle 
age is not motivated entirely by altruism. This, if true, implies that, as far as home health care service 
for frail or ill parents is concerned, a competitive bargaining between the two generation rather than 
altruism toward old parents prevails, and as a consequence, the weight of altruism 'l  does not 
matter. Even in this case, the estimated 'l , substantially replaced by '~l , may not be zero but a 
positive value. 
23 If in case C ''~ ll =  by chance, then 0=tw . 
24 For example, a drastically less altruism toward parents (small 'l ) causes precautionary saving, 
especially under the old-age mortality risk, because of the necessity of self-insurance. 
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process. (Ex-ante optimality of generation t  as of period t  in terms of two-way altruistic 
utility) However, since the objective function involves the utilities of two adjacent 
generations over just two corresponding periods, the following two welfare criteria could be 
considered. 
Criterion 1 (case C)-Ex-post Pareto optimality between generation t and t+1 as of period t+2: 
Assume that the period t  state variables 11 ~,, -- ttt SnH  and the period 2+t  state 
variables 112
~,, +++ ttt SnH  are exogenously given, and that the period 2+t  state 
variables 112
~,, +++ ttt SnH and life strategies{ }+¥=tttttt shn ''''' ,,, w  solve the problem (5.1), given 
the period t  state variables 11 ~,, -- ttt SnH . Then is the allocation, which is determined 
between generation t  and 1+t , as generation t  control variables },,{ ttt shn  and 1+t  
control variables }{ 1+tw , Pareto-efficient for generation t ’s per-capita utility (u ) and 1+t ’s 
altruism-adjusted aggregate utility ( 111 )( +-+ º ttt unu e )? 25 26 27 
Criterion 2 (case C)-Ex-post efficiency of generation t as of period t+1:  
Assume that the period t  state variables 11 ~,, -- ttt SnH  are exogenously given, and that the 
period 1+t  state variables ttt SnH ~,,1+ and life strategies { }+¥=tttttt shn ''''' ,,, w  solve the 
problem (5.1), given the period t  state variables 11 ~,, -- ttt SnH . Then is the allocation, which 
                                                   
25 )( 12)( ctctt uuu ++º dp is the per-capita whole-life utility of generation t . The altruism-adjusted 
aggregate utility, 111 )( +-+ º ttt unu e , could be replaced with a per-capita whole-life utility 1+tu  or a 
simple aggregate utility 11 ++ º ttt unu . 
26 Clearly 111 )( +-+ º ttt unu e  is increasing and concave with respect to tn . In case B, tu  is concave 
with respect to tn , increasing for nnt ˆ< , but decreasing for tnn <ˆ . 
27 In case A, state variables are tH  and control variables are ttt shn ,, . In case B, state variables are 
1, -tt nH  and control variables are ttt hn w,, . 
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generation t  implements as control variables },,,{ tttt shn w , the best for generation t ’s 
per-capita two-way altruistic utility ( tV ), keeping 1+t ’s altruism-adjusted aggregate 
two-way altruistic utility ( )~,,(~)( 1111 tttttt SnHVnV ++-+ = e ) constant? 
As a matter of fact, criterion 1 is the static analysis on an ex-post Pareto efficiency 
criterion as of period 2+t , in terms of the individual whole life utilities of two adjacent 
generations t  and 1+t . Then it is possible to consider some virtual and symmetric 
bargaining between tu  and 1+tu  in the ex-post context as of period 2+t , as if fertility tn  
and human capital investment th  (and compensation tw ) are traded commodities. In 
general, these recursive dynamic equations ((4.1), (5.1) and (6.1)) do not succeed in 
internalizing the marginal effects of generation 1+t ’s human capital 1+tH  on 2+t ’s 
human capital 2+tH , within generation 1+t ’s two-way altruistic utility 1+tV , therefore an 
envelope theorem 11111 //),(~ +++++ ¶¶=××× ttttt HVdHHVd  does not hold. In addition, since 
we have 0/ 112 ¹@¶¶ +++ ttt AhHH  even under a growth regime, the failure in this 
envelope theorem could be a potential cause for the ex-post distortion (misallocation) in 
,...},{ tt hn  between generation t  and 1+t . As a consequence, the next equations for some 
positive coefficient k  might not be satisfied for equating the marginal rate of substitution 
between tu  and 1+tu  among traded commodities, tn , )(1 tt hH +  (and 1+tw ): 
0// 1 =¶¶+¶¶ + ttntt nunu k , 0// 111 =¶¶+¶¶ +++ tthtt HuHu k ,  
(and 0// 111 =¶¶+¶¶ +++ tttt uu wkw w   in case B and C)   
and )( wkkkk === hn       (6.2) 
In case A, other state variables, tt Sn ~, , do not affect the life strategies },,{ 111 +++ ttt shn , so 
the corresponding envelope theorems hold.28 Then some distortionary effect in ex-post sense 
                                                   
28 That is, ttttttt nVdnSnHVd ¶¶= +++ //)~,,(~ 111  and ttttttt SVSdSnHVd ~/~/)~,,(~ 111 ¶¶= +++ . 
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essentially remains even under a growth regime, where hn klk >= .29 In case B, under 
again a growth regime, hkl ='/1  and hkl > . So setting 1'>ll  ( )hn kk ®  enables the 
marginal rates of substitution between th  and th  to be closer across the two generations. 
Also we have 0,,/1 <=>¶¶ + tt nw , if se <=> ,, , respectively, and assume that tt nn ¶¶ + /1  
and tt nH ¶¶ + /2  are negligibly small. Then the marginal rates of substitution between tn  
and th  are more closely equated, if 1'>ll  for se <  or 1'<ll  for se > . In case C, the 
general inefficiency in terms of the above criterion arises from one simple aspect that the 
old-age utility of parental generation, ))(( ,2)( tot cuu = , is not additively separable in terms 
of saving part mttt sHHDS )]([~ 111 --- +=  and compensation part )(1 HHn ttt +-w , hence 
other state variables, 11
~, -- tt Sn , as well as tH , do affect the life strategies },,,{ tttt shn w . 
Briefly one important implication of the above analysis is that: 
Either in case A, B or C, or either in a growth or stagnant regime, dynamic 
consistency ( 1'=ll ) might not necessarily ensure the ex-post Pareto efficiency.  
In spite of a perfect foresight with perfect certainty assumed in these economies, the ex-post 
efficiency (as of period 2+t ) is not achieved in general except for special cases, while the 
ex-ante efficiency (as of period t ) always holds. As a matter of course, the above virtual 
thought experiment, using ex-post Pareto optimality criterion, contains some essential 
limitations that such symmetric bargaining between generation t  and 1+t  (in infancy) is 
actually unrealizable, and that searching for Pareto improving parameters including 
sell ,,',  itself necessarily moves the values of the period 2+t  state 
variables 112
~,, +++ ttt SnH , which are assumed to be exogenously given. 
                                                   
29 Under a growth regime (case A), the ex-post optimal allocation },{ optopt hn  proves to satisfy 
topt nn <  and topt hh > , from 0)/)(/( 122 <¶¶¶¶ +++ tttt HHHV . 
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Other miscellaneous issues regarding two-way altruism are now stated.  
Does dynamic inconsistency imply dynamic inefficiency? Is it actually costly?  
Not necessarily. In case A, the inconsistency does not matter. In case B, I showed 
that the combination of altruism toward parents and children )',( ll  is crucial for 
determining a threshold level of initial human capital and productivity in a transition 
process (stagnant to growth or growth to stagnant), but dynamic consistency (I and 
III, )1'( =ll ) might not necessarily attain the lowest threshold into a growth regime, or the 
largest growth rate, or the best two-way altruistic utility of the generation. Rather, in the 
presented results, dynamic consistency holds a higher threshold of productivity for keeping 
a growth regime than inconsistent case (II or IV). In an egoistic economy (II, 
)5.0',5.0( == ll ), once growth happens, then it attains similar or larger investment on 
human capital, as compared with a consistent economy (I, )0.2',5.0( == ll ). With more 
altruism toward parents (III or IV, )2( =l ), even under low productivity, the transition path 
toward growth is “patient”, in the sense that the human capital investment th  is slowly 
increasing as time passes. In terms of the attained utility, the value function increases with 
more altruism either toward parents or children, but the normalized value function 
decreases. 
Formulation of altruism, vertical vs. horizontal altruism 
In this article, altruism is defined as a linearly-weighted and additively separable 
utility, which is an implicit restriction, exhibiting a decreasing return to scale of economy. 
This assumption is also the object for future econometric test. Theoretically, at least 
one-sided altruism (forward or backward) is essential and sufficient for the derivation of life 
strategies in a typical overlapping generation model, if dynamic consistency is implicitly 
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assumed. Further positive implication of altruism can be found, for example, where there 
exists some positive production externality in a small community (firms, families, 
neighborhood or etc.) and this externality could be internalized, to some extent, within the 
altruistic utility framework. In this situation, especially in “horizontal” altruism, a member 
is obliged to take care of the marginal effects of other members’ human/physical capital 
accumulation, and consequently the price of capital becomes closer to a socially optimal level 
and for some condition the economy might be shifted from stagnant to growth regime.30 
Here one point, which should be paid careful attention for, is that the existence of 
consumption externality is not a sufficient condition for enabling this mechanism, but the 
way to control the consumption of other members (at intra-family, intra-firm or 
intra-community) through some investment/distributive channels needs to be precisely 
specified.31 The model of this article, with two-way vertical altruism, satisfies it between 
two neighbor generations (young/old adulthood) within one identical family, while another 
important factor, specification of old-age capital investment & production, is missing here. 
Therefore, the additional incorporation of old-age working activities is essential to examine 
the degree of intergenerational economic synergies caused by the internalization of 
intergenerational production externalities, and is left for further work.32 
Fluctuation and patience 
Nishimura and Benhabib (1993, 1989) analyze the mechanism for endogenous 
fertility fluctuation in a Barro-Becker model. Their results basically apply also to the 
                                                   
30 This is clear, for example, from the explanation by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) (section 7.3.1), in 
which the internalization of production externality under the AK model is described. 
31 In other words, without this specification the inter/intra-generational consumption externality 
remains to be just an externality. 
32 As a matter of fact, this kind of intra-family and inter-generational (old-middle age) interaction 
should not be over-valued, simply because it is rather a rare case that children inherit the same (or 
similar) profession as parents’, and this interaction might be limited to household activities, for 
example, bringing up grandchildren. 
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two-way altruistic model in this article, even for the case of adjusted-fertility neutralization, 
se = . The phenomenon of “patience” appears in a transition process with a relatively low 
(mediocre but not too low) productivity A  and initial human capital 1H , and a highl , when 
the time horizon is finite and the reaction (policy) functions gradually change as the 
expectation that the day the next generation will be sure to take the same life strategies is 
coming soon. See, for example, Lengwiler (2005), Kim, Kim and Levin (2003) or Gong (2006). 
 
Construction of old-age pension scheme 
The old-age pension scheme can be represented by a set ),( ItIts w , where 
I
t
P
tt sss +=  and ItPtt www += . Here superscript P and I  denote a private, and a 
social/market insurance part respectively, therefore Its , Itw  and Ptw  represent funded 
pension, unfunded pension and intra-family intergenerational transfer, respectively. Itw  
and Ptw  can be divided into two parts, premium (certainty) part Itw  and Ptw , and 
actuarially fair risk sharing (insurance) part Itw~  and Ptw~  ( ItItIt www ~+=  and 
P
t
P
t
P
t www ~+= ).33 As is clear from the discussion so far, ),( ItIts w  and ),( PtPts w  do 
depend on the combination of altruism )',( ll , as well as the externalities from parental 
generation, 11
~, -- tt Sn .34 
 
7. Comparison with dynastic framework 
                                                   
33 0~~ == PtIt EE ww . 
34 Iwamoto (2006) suggests the importance of the social/market compensation scheme in its insurance 
part Itw~ , as well as in its premium part Itw .  
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The definitions, equilibrium conditions and corresponding properties of a simple 
dynastic utility maximizer are summarized in Appendix 2. Here I consider the backward 
induction of a dynastic utility incorporating intergenerational linkage with parents 
(backward altruism). A simple dynastic utility is defined as: 
×××+++=
×××+++º
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+++
211
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1
2
11
211
)()()(
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Compensation rate tw  is determined at period 1-t  as an implicit contract between the 
generation (vintage t ) and its parental generation (vintage 1-t ). In order to internalize this 
intergenerational linkage with parental generation, define a “two-way-altruistic” associated 
dynastic utility: 
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 (7.2) 
where
111
2
1 )(
')('ˆ
--
- º
tt
t nnan p
dpll  is the degree of altruism toward parent. Assuming that the 
generation holds a bargaining power for determining compensation rate tw , and determines 
its life strategies in a recursive and backward induction, the value function, in which tw  is 
internalized within altruistic dynastic utility tVˆ , becomes: 
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 (7.3) 
Here the objective function is tVˆ . In (7.3), 11 ~,, -- ttt SnH  are state variables, and 
tttt snh ,,, w  are control variables. Of course, generation t  takes account of the strategic 
effects of its own decision on subsequent generations. 
Proposition 7-1: Assume that the economy is not in steady state. Then, (7.3) are not 
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sufficient for internalizing the equilibrium conditions for 1+tH  (A2.3) and 1+tN  (A2.4). In 
addition, assume 0=D  (no saving incentive). Then (A2.3) could be internalized. 
Proposition 7-2: In problem (7.3), dynamic inconsistency ( 1'¹ll ) implies dynamic 
inefficiency in terms of dynastic utility. 
Proposition 7-3: Assume that the economy is both in steady state 
({ } { }snhsnh tttt ,,,,,, ww = ), and in dynamic consistency ( 1'=ll ). Then the dynamically 
efficient solution in terms of dynastic utility, which satisfies (A2.2-5), solves problem (7.3). 
 
In case that the economy is not in steady state ({ } { }snhsnh tttt ,,,,,, ww ¹ ), (7.3) does not 
necessarily ensure, even under dynamic consistency, that equilibrium conditions, especially 
those for 1+tH  and 1+tN , are automatically satisfied, because they range, as seen in (A2.3) 
and (A2.4), over three periods, therefore the envelope theorem, as expected in a 
representative agent’s utility, does not hold.  
Consider the following (altruistic) dynastic utility maximizer:  
{ }
{ } tsnhtttttt
Vsnh
tttttt
ˆmaxarg,,,
''''' ,,,
''''' ¥
=
=¢¢¢¢ ¥=
w
w  
{ }
{ } 1,,,1'''''
ˆmaxarg,,,
1'''''
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+= ¥
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=¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢ t
snh
tttttt Vsnh
tttttt w
w  
where ttt hHHAH ¢+=¢+ )(1  and mttt sHHDS ))((~ ¢+º¢  
{ }¥=¢¢¢¢ tttttt snh ''''' ,,, w  is a set of subsequent life strategies, which maximizes the altruistic 
dynastic utility of generation t  on the condition of current environment, 11 ~,, -- ttt SnH , and 
{ }¥ +=¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢ 1''''' ,,, tttttt snh w  is a set of subsequent life strategies, which maximizes the altruistic 
dynastic utility of generation 1+t  on the condition of next period environment, 
ttt SnH ¢¢¢+ ~,,1 . Although, under dynamic consistency )1'( =ll , { }¥=¢¢¢¢ tttttt snh ''''' ,,, w  satisfies 
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the dynastic equilibrium conditions (A2.2-5), in general, { }tttt snh ¢¢¢¢ ,,, w does not necessarily 
coincide with the solution of (7.3). Also, there is no guarantee, in general, that next relations 
are automatically satisfied: 
{ } { }¥ +=¥ += ¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢=¢¢¢¢ 1'''''1''''' ,,,,,, tttttttttttt snhsnh ww  
or { } { }'''''''''' ,,,lim,,,lim tttttttttt snhsnh ¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢=¢¢¢¢ ¥®¥® ww  
This implies that, in case that parental life strategies remarkably deviate from a steady 
state (that is, { } { }ssnnhhsnh tttt D+D+D+D+= ,,,,,, www ), the next generation might 
not necessarily trace the same dynamic path as their parents expected, wherein there might 
still be a cause of some ex-ante dynamic inefficiency and perturbation. 
Lastly I come back again to the recursive induction problem of altruistic dynastic 
utility (7.3). I compare the transition paths of th , tn  and tw  under (7.3) with those in 
Case B of two-way altruistic utility, using the same set of parameters as (b) ( 01 =H  and 
A  is moving at 2.5, 5.0 and 7.5). See Table 4. One distinct feature in dynastic utility 
approach, from two-way altruistic utility, is that even in IV (more altruism both toward 
parents and children) compensation rate tw  is relatively low, because the larger altruism 
toward childrenl , working as a multiplier and prevailing over the one toward parents 'l , is 
a major determinant for a long-run compensation habit.35 Other remarkable characteristics 
are as follows: (1) A threshold of productivity from stagnant to growth regime is lower than 
in two-way altruistic approach. (2) Under more altruism toward children ( 12 >=l , III and 
IV), human capital investment th  is relatively high from the very beginning ( 1=t ), even 
with low productivity ( 5.2=A ). (3) Under less altruism toward children ( 15.0 <=l , I and 
II), compensation rate tw  drastically decreases as productivity A  increases, while, under 
                                                   
35 In two-way altruistic approach, 'l  is rather a major determinant factor for the compensation rate 
tw . 
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more altruism toward children ( 12 >=l , III and IV), tw  is kept negligibly small. 
 
8. Comparative statistics of equilibrium paths 
 Consider case B (compensation but no saving economy). The first order condition 
(5.2) can be compactly rewritten in the following equations. 
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with equality if 0>tn .   
Assume that the second and third equations in (5.2a) hold with equality, that is, the 
non-negativity constraints in human capital and fertility are not binding. With a slight 
change in some parameter represented as tB , the first order total differentiation of (5.2a) 
becomes: 
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In a matrix form: 
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and XadjXX det/1 =-        (8.2)36 
If tB  is some parameter or state variable contained in old-age parental utility part 
)()('ˆ ,21 tt cun -l , for example, if 'l=tB  or 1-= tt nB , then 0/1 =¶¶ + tHt BV t  and 
0/ =¶¶ tnt BV t . Therefore: 
 0)/)(det/( 11 =¶¶-= tttt dBBVXCd tww , 0)/)(det/( 112 =¶¶-= + ttHtt dBBVXCdh t  and 
0)/)(det/( 13 =¶¶-= ttntt dBBVXCdn t , where ijC  is the cofactor of X . (8.3) 
Clearly tdw , tdh  and tdn  are the functions of l  as well as 'l  and d .37  Now the 
directions of marginal effects of 'l  and 1-tn  on life strategies tw , th  and tn  are 
summarized as follows. 
Proposition 8-1:  
)det/sgn()'/sgn( 11 XCdd t -=lw , )det/sgn()'/sgn( 12 XCddht -=l ,  
)det/sgn()'/sgn( 13 XCddht -=l  
If se > , then )det/sgn()/sgn( 111 XCdnd tt -=-w , )det/sgn()/sgn( 121 XCdndh tt -=- ,  
and )det/sgn()/sgn( 131 XCdndn tt -=- . 
And if se < , )det/sgn()/sgn( 111 XCdnd tt =-w , )det/sgn()/sgn( 121 XCdndh tt =- ,  
and )det/sgn()/sgn( 131 XCdndn tt =- .  
 
                                                   
36 adj  and det  denote the adjoint and determinant of the matrix, respectively. 
37 Xdet , 11C , 12C  and 13C  are quadratic functions of l as well as linear ones of 'l . 
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These results suggest the possibility of dynamic fluctuations in a quasi-growth state, 
especially where the non-negativity constraints in th  and tn  are not binding. However, 
since th  and tn  are substitutes, two other possible equilibria are one where 0=th  and 
tn  is large, and another where minnnt =  and th  is large. One intuitive explanation 
regarding the indirect strategic (feed-back) effect of backward altruism 'l  is as follows. 
From the F.O.C in tw  (5.2), we have ttttt nhvnK ww º--= )1( , 
where ssedl /11 })('1/{1 ---+= tnK . Plugging this into young adult consumption term, 
[ ] )1/())(1)(1( 1,2 ss -+---= -HHnhvnKc ttttt , where )1( K- is a negative income 
effect. On the other hand, the maximization problem of two-way altruistic utility (5.1) can be 
written as a problem of one-way forward altruism, in which the discount rate d  and 
forward altruism coefficient l  are effectively replaced with sdd --º 1)1/(~ K  and 
sll --º 1)1/(~ K , respectively. In effect, )(~ dd >  and )(~ ll >  operate as an accelerator of 
human capital investment. It is quite ambiguous which effect prevails, the negative income 
effect or the positive forward pushing effect, and is one main purpose of calibration. 
 
9. The impact of unfunded (PAYG) social security on the equilibrium paths 
In this section, I analyze the impact of a defined benefit type unfunded social 
security (PAYG) system on equilibrium paths and regime change, on the basis of analysis by 
Ehrlich and Lui (1998) and Ehrlich and Kim (2007). As for this issue under two-sided 
altruism, we also have, for example, Altig and Davis (1993) or Cigno and Rosati (1996). 
Assuming that the altruism coefficients toward parents and children )',( ll  are fixed in 
values, I consider the following three cases.38 39  
                                                   
38 Cigno and Rosati (1996) examine the three cases, self-interest, forward and backward altruism, 
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(1) Two-way altruism  01' >== ll  
(2) Forward one-way altruism  01 >=l , 0'@l  
(3) Backward one-way altruism   0@l , 01' >=l  
As in Ehrlich and Lui (1998), I define the unfunded social security tax as a mandatory 
transfer from the generation of young adult-hood children to old parents )( Ittt HT wq =º , 
whereq  is the (expected) proportional social security tax levied on the middle age income 
part earned only by the acquired human capital tH . Then the young/adult-hood 
consumptions of generation t  are: 
ttttttttt THHHHsnhvnc -+-+---= )())(1( 2,1 pw  
1211111,2 )/())(()( ++++ ++++= ttmtttttt TnsHHDHHnc pppw   (9.1) 
Also assume 11 @p  and 12 <p . The defined expected benefit which is transferred from 
children to parents becomes 121 )/( +ttTnpp , in which fully actuarially fair insurance is also 
implicitly assumed. Here the compensation rate tw , transferred as a conditional payment on 
parents’ survival, is not determined through an actuarially fair condition or other 
restrictions, but only through altruism coefficients toward parents and children ( 'l  andl ), 
in which this spontaneous intra-family intergenerational transfer might not be necessarily 
actuarially fair.40 41 Table 5 shows the calibration results for 5=T  regarding the effects of 
                                                                                                                                                     
assuming the non-separable utility functions, if with altruism, incorporating individual utilities of 
parents or children. 
39 Case (1) exhibits symmetric altruism as well as dynamic consistency. 
40 Also the spontaneous transfer might not necessarily be a compensation ( 0>tEw ), but might be 
rather a bequest ( 0<tEw ). 
41  These settings assume that the intra-family bargaining between old-age parents and young 
adult-hood children is motivated on altruism ( 'l ) as a state-contingent claim only on the survival of 
old parents, and the social security tax rate (q ) involves both certainty premium transfer, and 
actuarially fair (partial) insurance proportional to the amount of transfer. Under fully actuarially fair 
insurance instead, it proves that the intra-family bargaining involves only certainty premium 
re-transfer as a perfect substitute. In either way (with partial or full insurance), the existence of 
unfunded social security tax affects subsequent equilibrium paths. 
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social security tax rateq  on the growth rate and fertility, with 5.0=s , 5.0=e , 5.0=d , 
0.2=D , 1.0=v , 0.1=m , 0.1=H  and )(5.0~ 10 HHS += , which plots the transition 
paths of life strategies for case (1) (2) and (3) in case C (both saving and compensation 
economy), (a) 5=A  and 1H  is moving at 0.0, 2.5 and 5.0, (b) 01 =H  and A  is moving 
at 2.0, 8.0, and (c) 101 =H  and A  is moving at 1.0 and 3.0.42 43 
Since 0.1=m  exhibits a constant return to scale in saving, and so the 
compensation is likely to be especially in a steady state, either constraints in saving or 
compensation are likely to be binding as the calibration results show. The effects of the 
increase in unfunded social security tax rateq  on human capital investment and fertility 
are summarized in the next proposition. 
Proposition 9-1: Social security tax rateq , which incorporates actuarially fair (partially or 
fully) insurance of mortality risk, as well as certainty premium transfer, does affect dynamic 
equilibrium paths, even if the intra-family bargaining between old-age parents and young 
adult-hood children is motivated on altruism ( 'l ). As far as calibration results are 
concerned, the larger q  tends to induce the decrease in fertility and the increase in human 
capital investment under two-way altruism ((1) 01' >== ll ) or forward altruism ((2) 
01 >=l , 0'@l ), with an intermediate (mediocre but not too low) productivity A  and a 
low initial human capital 1H .  
 
Introduction of mortality risk 
The above analysis could be meaningfully extended to the case where the mortality risk for 
                                                   
42 The same calibration window as in (4.4) is used. The intervals are 0.1 in w,, sh and 0.5 inn . 
43 In this calibration, I set 0'@l  in (2) and 0@l  in (3), in order to represent an egoistic 
(completely indifferent) attitude for the neighbor generation. However, since these assumptions easily 
bring about the constraints’ in compensation, non-negative saving, or non-negative consumption, being 
binding, these values might not necessarily be appropriate to observe carefully the impact of social 
security on fertility and human capital investment decisions. 
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old adult-hood exists and the mechanisms of social/intra-family risk sharing, as well as 
premium transfer, are considered. Here the unfunded social security tax is rewritten as 
I
tt
I
t
I
t
I
tt HT wqwww ~~ +=+==  ( tIt Hqw =  and 0~ =ItEw ), and the intra-family transfer 
contract between old-age parents and young adulthood children is defined as 
P
t
P
t
P
t www ~+= . The short-run aspects of intergenerational risk sharing, social/market 
insurance and self-insurance, are described in Aoki (2007), and can be applied to the 
arguments on dynamic paths. At first, some basic implications immediately extracted from 
Aoki (2007) are summarized as follows. See Appendix 3 and Figure 3 for complementary 
explanation. The “participation constraints” are now considered, in which both old-age 
parents and young adulthood children are, on the individual (not altruistic) utility of each 
generation, willing to accept the proposed intra-family transfer contract. 
Proposition 9-2: Assume that the intra-family bargaining between old-age parents and 
young adult-hood children is motivated on altruism ( 'l ), and the social security tax rate (q ) 
involves only certainty premium transfer )( tIt Hqw = , not actuarially fair insurance Itw~ , 
and the participation constraint of each generation regarding intra-family bargaining is not 
binding. Then,q does not affect any subsequent equilibrium life strategies. In other words, 
Recardian equivalence does hold.44 
 
Other short-run implications under different assumptions are described as follows.45 
Corollary 9-1: Assume again that the intra-family bargaining between old-age parents and 
young adult-hood children is motivated on altruism ( 'l ), and the social security tax rate (q ) 
                                                   
44 This proposition is presumably equivalent with Proposition 5 in Altig and Davis (1993), but holds 
only with absence of actuarially fair insurance of social security. 
45 Corollary 9-2, 3 and 5 are straightforwardly derived from Lemma 1 and 2 in Aoki (2007). 
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involves only certainty premium transfer, not actuarially fair insurance, but that the 
participation constraint of young adult-hood children is now binding.46 Then the larger q  
induces the larger private compensation scheme Ptw  in actuarially fair insurance part Ptw~  
with )(~ PtPt VarVar ww = . 
Corollary 9-2: Assume that the intra-family bargaining between old-age parents and young 
adult-hood children is not available, and the social security tax rate (q ) involves both 
certainty premium transfer, and fully actuarially fair insurance. Then the larger q  induces 
the larger insurance compensation scheme Itw  in both certainty premium )( ItIt Eww =  
and actuarially fair insurance Itw~  with )(~ ItIt VarVar ww = . 
Corollary 9-3: Assume that the intra-family bargaining between old-age parents and young 
adult-hood children is not available, and the social security tax rate (q ) involves only 
certainty premium transfer, not actuarially fair insurance. Then the largerq  induces the 
larger self-insurance cost. 
Corollary 9-4: Assume that the intra-family bargaining between old-age parents and young 
adult-hood adult children is not available. Then one unit of certainty premium transfer from 
young adulthood generation to old adulthood generation is equivalent with the actuarially 
fair insurance of old-age mortality risk with variance ))1(/(1 22 pp - . 
Corollary 9-5: Assume that the intra-family bargaining between old-age parents and young 
adult-hood children is competitive, and the social security tax rate (q ) involves both 
certainty premium transfer )( tIt Hqw = and the fixed level of actuarially fair insurance.47 
                                                   
46 In Figure 3 (or figures (1-4) in Aoki (2007)), the only Pareto optimal contract, in which the 
participation constraint for children is binding with no social security available, is represented as 
pointG . 
47 The actuarially fair insurance, which is more than a fixed level in variance, is necessary for 
enabling Arrow-Debreu competitive (state-contingent exchange) economy. (Aoki (2007))  
 45 
Then the largerq  induces the larger private compensation scheme Ptw  in actuarially fair 
insurance part Ptw~ with )(~ PtPt VarVar ww = . 
 
Obviously under the assumptions of corollary 9-1 to 4, Recardian equivalence does not 
necessarily hold in a dynamic context. As a consequence, social security tax rate (q ) do 
affect not only the subsequent life strategies including fertility, but also the critical values of 
initial state variables for the regime (stagnant to growth, growth to stagnant) change. In 
general, these settings could be potentially, contrary to proposition 9-1, a trigger into a 
Malthusian trap because of a resultant negative income effect, which is a trade-off with a 
forward-pushing effect based on backward altruism.   
 
10. Final remarks 
Thus this article has just tried to pursuit the implications of simultaneous two-way 
altruism (both forward and backward altruism) in a human capital/fertility endogenized 
overlapping generation model. Here I have been trying to calculate out the 
two-way-altruism-based value function with steady/unsteady state analysis on a two-sided 
altruistic framework as well as a dynastic one. The concept of “two-sided altruism” 
originates in a series of related literatures, for example, Abel (1987), Altig and Davis (1993) 
or Kimball (1987). Also Blackburn and Cipriani (2005) examine two-sided altruism as well 
as forward altruism, in their fertility endogenous growth model. Especially Abel (1987) 
examines the implication of two-sided altruism rather essentially, basically from viewpoints 
of transfer motives and steady states. In my article, the fertility-endogenized and 
human-capital-based two-way altruistic utility and corresponding value function are defined 
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as in (3.6) and (3.7), in which strategic effects for the offspring are also taken account of. It is 
seen that (3.6) covers all the relevant utilities for the adjacent two periods ( t  and 1+t ) 
with well capturing the generation’s altruism for both their parents and children. This form 
does not only fit well in reality, but also enables the recursive computation even for the 
case 1)(1 >>nnalp  without the possibility of value function’s divergence to infinity, where 
the generation cares, as is often the case, far more about children than about themselves. In 
addition, any form of one-way (forward/backward) altruism is not exclusive with two-way 
altruism at all, but rather can be considered to be just one special case of this two-way 
altruistic setting. For example, the assumptions of Ehrlich & Lui (1991) are equivalent with 
the case where 1>>l , nna /1)( = (inelastic altruism per child), 1'=ll  (dynamic 
consistency), and in addition, an implicit contract regarding compensation rate, patents 
conclude with children during young adulthood, is now internalized within children’s 
maximization problem in the next period. Or, “self interest” holds for the case where 0@l  
and 0'@l , or “backward altruism” holds for the case where 0@l  and 0'>>l . 
Therefore, two-way altruism is, more or less altruistic, just a convenient 
generalization as well as a technical simplification for enabling recursive programming, in 
which the determination of all the relevant life strategies for forthcoming two adjacent 
periods can be incorporated within the decision making problem of corresponding vintage 
generation, without any intergenerational bargaining confliction. Concisely speaking, 
two-way altruism might still make distinct implications from one-sided (forward/backward) 
altruism especially when: 
1. Parental (forward) altruism toward offspring is not dynamically consistent with children’s 
(backward) altruism toward parents, in terms of the ratio in intergenerational marginal rate 
of transfer (bequest/compensation). (That is, 1'¹ll .) 
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2. The economy is not in a growth/stagnant steady state. (Kimball (1987) comments a 
similar implication from a different context, in which “dynamic inefficiency” arises whenever 
the initial life strategies deviate from Golden Rule.) This case includes a transition process 
from a stagnant/growth state to growth/stagnant one.  
3. Steady states in two-way altruism are different from those in dynastic utility because of a 
strategic rebound effect from the next generation. 
4. There exist some unexpected shocks in initial state variables 001
~,, SnH , life strategies 
{ }snh ,,, w , or productivity or etc, which the next generation might (or might not) fully 
insure within its own decision making in a two-way altruistic framework. 
5. Unfunded social security system involves mandatory inter-generational transfer in terms 
of either certainty premium or actuarially fair insurance. 
On the other hand, this article does not assume the old-age working activity, and the 
intra-family production externality from parental generation does not exist here. Therefore, 
by means of specifying the altruism toward parents, the Pareto improvement is achieved by 
young adulthood only through more efficient allocation with old parents, while the altruism 
toward children is directly a driving force for human capital/fertility investment, a 
motivation for future return (including compensation) from children hopefully in a growth 
regime. Thus the role of altruism is substantially distinct in each direction (toward parents 
or children).48 
Within some limited focus stated above, I have just summarized, under this 
generalized two-way altruistic framework, propositions and implications regarding 
                                                   
48  As a matter of fact, the larger 'l  (more altruism toward parents) could be a negative direct effect 
for future (human capital/fertility) investment toward children through a negative income effect for 
the generation, while it could be, as a social norm in the long run, an incentive (positive indirect 
feed-back effect) for future return. Since these two direct/indirect effects, involving complicated first 
order conditions, cannot be analytically solved in a rigorous closed form, I calculate out their effects by 
means of computational calibration. 
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dynamics, and calibration results, especially focusing on 1 and 2 among the above points. 
The results also support the existence of two equilibria (one with larger growth and low 
fertility, and the other with low growth and large fertility), claimed by Becker et al. (1990) 
and Ehrlich et al. (1991), even under two-way altruism. 
The implications obtained in this article suggest a strong necessity to implement 
empirical works involving two-way altruism.49  For example, it may be meaningful to 
construct the model incorporating two-way altruism and human capital investment, as well 
as endogenized fertility and saving, in addition, allowing for a continuous-time old age with 
mortality risk and a non-separable utility form.50 For one simple example, we may try an 
econometric test for the hypothesis that this OLG is dynamically consistent, that 
is })(/{)('ˆ 11121 --- = ttt nnan lpdpl . At least, estimating separately 'l  and l (altruism 
toward parents and children) as well as other parameters, especially in Japan, would be a 
useful information for the construction of appropriate funded/unfunded social security 
programs.  
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Case A (Saving but no compensation economy)
(a) A=5
(i) lamda=0.5
h H1=0.5 H1=1.5 H1=2.5 n H1=0.5 H1=1.5 H1=2.5 s H1=0.5 H1=1.5 H1=2.5
t=1 0.02 0.48 0.4 t=1 2 0.5 0.5 t=1 0.25 0.24 0.25
t=2 0 0.5 0.5 t=2 2 0.5 0.5 t=2 0.27 0.23 0.23
t=3 0 0.52 0.52 t=3 2 0.5 0.5 t=3 0.27 0.23 0.23
t=4 0 0.52 0.52 t=4 2 0.5 0.5 t=4 0.27 0.23 0.23
t=5 0 0.52 0.52 t=5 2 0.5 0.5 t=5 0.27 0.23 0.23
t=6 0 0.52 0.52 t=6 2 0.5 0.5 t=6 0.27 0.23 0.23
t=7 0 0.54 0.54 t=7 2 0.5 0.5 t=7 0.27 0.23 0.23
t=8 0 0.5 0.5 t=8 2 0.5 0.5 t=8 0.27 0.23 0.23
t=9 0.02 0.64 0.64 t=9 2 0.5 0.5 t=9 0.25 0.21 0.21
t=10 0 0.42 0.42 t=10 2 0.5 0.5 t=10 0.12 0.13 0.13
t=11 - - - t=11 - - - t=11 - - -
(ii) lamda=2
h H1=0.5 H1=1.5 H1=2.5 n H1=0.5 H1=1.5 H1=2.5 s H1=0.5 H1=1.5 H1=2.5
t=1 0.16 0.7 0.7 t=1 2 1 1 t=1 0.16 0.06 0.06
t=2 0.04 1 1 t=2 2 0.5 0.5 t=2 0.24 0.16 0.16
t=3 0.14 0.72 0.72 t=3 2 1 1 t=3 0.18 0.06 0.06
t=4 0.52 1 1 t=4 1 0.5 0.5 t=4 0.12 0.16 0.16
t=5 0.4 0.72 0.72 t=5 1.5 1 1 t=5 0.08 0.06 0.06
t=6 0.02 1 1 t=6 2 0.5 0.5 t=6 0.26 0.16 0.16
t=7 0.12 0.72 0.72 t=7 2 1 1 t=7 0.18 0.06 0.06
t=8 0.02 0.98 0.98 t=8 2 0.5 0.5 t=8 0.26 0.16 0.16
t=9 0.28 0.78 0.78 t=9 2 1 1 t=9 0.08 0.04 0.04
t=10 0.74 0.78 0.78 t=10 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=10 0.02 0.02 0.02
t=11 - - - t=11 - - - t=11 - - -  
Table 1-1 Transition Paths in Case A 
Case A (Saving but no compensation economy)
(b) H1=0.0
(i) lamda=0.5
h A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0 n A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0 s A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0
t=1 0 0 0 0.1 t=1 2 2 2 2 t=1 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.2
t=2 0 0 0.02 0.46 t=2 2 2 2 0.5 t=2 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.24
t=3 0 0 0.04 0.62 t=3 2 2 2 0.5 t=3 0.27 0.27 0.24 0.22
t=4 0 0 0.04 0.72 t=4 2 2 2 0.5 t=4 0.27 0.27 0.24 0.2
t=5 0 0 0.02 0.74 t=5 2 2 2 0.5 t=5 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.2
t=6 0 0 0 0.74 t=6 2 2 2 0.5 t=6 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.2
t=7 0 0 0 0.78 t=7 2 2 2 0.5 t=7 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.18
t=8 0 0 0.02 0.66 t=8 2 2 2 0.5 t=8 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.2
t=9 0 0.02 0.04 0.94 t=9 2 2 2 0.5 t=9 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.16
t=10 0 0 0.02 0.52 t=10 2 2 2 0.5 t=10 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.1
t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - -
(ii) lamda=2
h A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0 n A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0 s A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0
t=1 0.19 0.32 0.86 0.32 t=1 2 2 1 2 t=1 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.06
t=2 0.16 0.04 0.06 0.02 t=2 2 2 2 2 t=2 0.16 0.24 0.22 0.26
t=3 0.11 0.06 0.18 0.12 t=3 2 2 2 2 t=3 0.19 0.22 0.14 0.18
t=4 0.04 1 0.04 0.02 t=4 2 0.5 2 2 t=4 0.2 0.16 0.24 0.26
t=5 0.03 0.18 0.14 0.12 t=5 2 2 2 2 t=5 0.2 0.14 0.18 0.18
t=6 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.04 t=6 2 2 2 2 t=6 0.17 0.24 0.24 0.24
t=7 0.11 0.1 0.18 0.7 t=7 2 2 2 1 t=7 0.19 0.2 0.14 0.06
t=8 0.09 0.02 0.1 0.96 t=8 2 2 2 0.5 t=8 0.2 0.26 0.2 0.16
t=9 0.15 0.28 0.74 0.84 t=9 2 2 1 1 t=9 0.17 0.08 0.06 0.02
t=10 0 0.74 0.8 0.82 t=10 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=10 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - -
Table 1-2 Transition Paths in Case A 
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Case A (Saving but no compensation economy)
(c) H1=10.0
(i) lamda=0.5
h A=1 A=2 A=3 A=4 n A=1 A=2 A=3 A=4 s A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0
t=1 0.08 0.36 0.46 0.44 t=1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=1 0.3 0.26 0.24 0.24
t=2 0 0.2 0.3 0.46 t=2 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=2 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.24
t=3 0 0 0.24 0.46 t=3 2 1.5 0.5 0.5 t=3 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.24
t=4 0 0 0.22 0.46 t=4 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=4 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.24
t=5 0 0 0.22 0.46 t=5 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=5 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.24
t=6 0 0 0.24 0.46 t=6 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=6 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.24
t=7 0 0 0.24 0.46 t=7 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=7 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.24
t=8 0 0 0.22 0.44 t=8 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=8 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.24
t=9 0 0 0.32 0.56 t=9 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=9 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.22
t=10 0 0 0.26 0.36 t=10 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=10 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.16
(ii) lamda=2
h A=1 A=2 A=3 A=4 n A=1 A=2 A=3 A=4 s A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0
t=1 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.8 t=1 2 2 2 1 t=1 0.21 0.2 0.18 0.04
t=2 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.18 t=2 2 2 2 2 t=2 0.26 0.2 0.22 0.14
t=3 0 0.18 0.04 1 t=3 2 2 2 0.5 t=3 0.27 0.15 0.24 0.16
t=4 0 0.02 1 0.12 t=4 2 2 0.5 2 t=4 0.27 0.2 0.16 0.18
t=5 0 0.1 0.12 0.16 t=5 2 2 2 2 t=5 0.27 0.2 0.18 0.16
t=6 0 0.12 0.08 0.06 t=6 2 2 2 2 t=6 0.27 0.19 0.22 0.22
t=7 0 0.14 0.2 0.12 t=7 2 2 2 2 t=7 0.27 0.17 0.14 0.18
t=8 0 0.08 0.02 0 t=8 2 2 2 2 t=8 0.27 0.2 0.26 0.26
t=9 0 0.2 0.16 0.22 t=9 2 2 2 2 t=9 0.27 0.13 0.16 0.12
t=10 0 0 0.02 0.08 t=10 2 2 2 2 t=10 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02
t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - -  
Table 1-3 Transition Paths in Case A  
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Case B (Compensation but no saving economy)
(a) A=5
I. lamda=0.5, lamdaprime=2.0
h H1=0.5 H1=1.5 H1=2.5 n H1=0.5 H1=1.5 H1=2.5 ω H1=0.5 H1=1.5 H1=2.5
t=1 0.06 0.54 0.56 t=1 2 0.5 0.5 t=1 0.34 0.34 0.34
t=2 0.01 0.58 0.6 t=2 2 0.5 0.5 t=2 0.38 0.32 0.32
t=3 0.02 0.6 0.6 t=3 2 0.5 0.5 t=3 0.38 0.32 0.32
t=4 0.01 0.6 0.6 t=4 2 0.5 0.5 t=4 0.38 0.32 0.32
t=5 0.02 0.6 0.6 t=5 2 0.5 0.5 t=5 0.38 0.32 0.32
t=6 0.01 0.6 0.6 t=6 2 0.5 0.5 t=6 0.38 0.32 0.32
t=7 0.02 0.6 0.6 t=7 2 0.5 0.5 t=7 0.38 0.32 0.32
t=8 0.01 0.56 0.56 t=8 2 0.5 0.5 t=8 0.38 0.34 0.34
t=9 0 0.68 0.68 t=9 2 0.5 0.5 t=9 0.4 0.3 0.3
t=10 0 0.42 0.42 t=10 2 0.5 0.5 t=10 0.3 0.3 0.3
t=11 - - - t=11 - - - t=11 - - -
II. lamda=0.5, lamdaprime=0.5
h H1=0.5 H1=1.5 H1=2.5 n H1=0.5 H1=1.5 H1=2.5 ω H1=0.5 H1=1.5 H1=2.5
t=1 0.18 0.18 0.68 t=1 2 2 0.5 t=1 0.03 0.03 0.04
t=2 0.06 0.02 0.8 t=2 2 2 0.5 t=2 0.04 0.04 0.03
t=3 0.04 0 0.82 t=3 2 2 0.5 t=3 0.04 0.05 0.03
t=4 0.12 0.1 0.82 t=4 2 2 0.5 t=4 0.03 0.04 0.03
t=5 0.04 0.06 0.82 t=5 2 2 0.5 t=5 0.04 0.04 0.03
t=6 0 0 0.82 t=6 2 2 0.5 t=6 0.05 0.05 0.03
t=7 0.1 0.1 0.84 t=7 2 2 0.5 t=7 0.04 0.04 0.03
t=8 0.04 0.02 0.76 t=8 2 2 0.5 t=8 0.04 0.04 0.03
t=9 0.04 0.04 0.94 t=9 2 2 0.5 t=9 0.04 0.04 0.03
t=10 0 0 0.52 t=10 2 2 0.5 t=10 0.09 0.09 0.07
t=11 - - - t=11 - - - t=11 - - -
III. lamda=2.0, lamdaprime=0.5
h H1=0.5 H1=1.5 H1=2.5 n H1=0.5 H1=1.5 H1=2.5 ω H1=0.5 H1=1.5 H1=2.5
t=1 0.24 0.88 0.88 t=1 2 1 1 t=1 0.02 0 0
t=2 1 0.2 0.16 t=2 0.5 2 2 t=2 0.03 0.02 0.03
t=3 0.2 0.24 0.24 t=3 2 2 2 t=3 0.02 0.02 0.02
t=4 0.04 0.04 0.04 t=4 2 2 2 t=4 0.04 0.04 0.04
t=5 0.16 0.16 0.16 t=5 2 2 2 t=5 0.03 0.03 0.03
t=6 0.04 0.04 0.04 t=6 2 2 2 t=6 0.04 0.04 0.04
t=7 0.12 0.12 0.12 t=7 2 2 2 t=7 0.03 0.03 0.03
t=8 0.08 0.08 0.08 t=8 2 2 2 t=8 0.04 0.04 0.04
t=9 0.32 0.32 0.32 t=9 2 2 2 t=9 0.01 0.01 0.01
t=10 0.76 0.76 0.76 t=10 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=10 0.01 0.01 0.01
t=11 - - - t=11 - - - t=11 - - -
IV. lamda=2.0, lamdaprime=2.0
h H1=0.5 H1=1.5 H1=2.5 n H1=0.5 H1=1.5 H1=2.5 ω H1=0.5 H1=1.5 H1=2.5
t=1 0.08 0.64 0.4 t=1 2 1 1.5 t=1 0.32 0.12 0.12
t=2 0 1 1 t=2 2 0.5 0.5 t=2 0.4 0.22 0.22
t=3 0.04 1 1 t=3 2 0.5 0.5 t=3 0.36 0.22 0.22
t=4 1 1 1 t=4 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=4 0.22 0.22 0.22
t=5 0.16 1 1 t=5 2 0.5 0.5 t=5 0.24 0.22 0.22
t=6 0.08 1 1 t=6 2 0.5 0.5 t=6 0.32 0.22 0.22
t=7 0.12 1 1 t=7 2 0.5 0.5 t=7 0.28 0.22 0.22
t=8 0.04 0.96 0.96 t=8 2 0.5 0.5 t=8 0.36 0.24 0.24
t=9 0.28 0.76 0.76 t=9 2 1 1 t=9 0.12 0.06 0.06
t=10 0.72 0.76 0.76 t=10 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=10 0.06 0.06 0.06  
Table 2-1 Transition Paths in Case B 
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Case B (Compensation but no saving economy)
(b) H1=0.0
I. lamda=0.5, lamdaprime=2.0
h A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0 n A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0 ω A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0
t=1 0 0 0.04 0.04 t=1 2 2 2 2 t=1 0.4 0.4 0.36 0.36
t=2 0 0.01 0.04 0.6 t=2 2 2 2 0.5 t=2 0.4 0.38 0.36 0.32
t=3 0 0.02 0.08 0.8 t=3 2 2 2 0.5 t=3 0.4 0.38 0.32 0.28
t=4 0 0.01 0.08 0.8 t=4 2 2 2 0.5 t=4 0.4 0.38 0.32 0.28
t=5 0 0.02 0.04 0.84 t=5 2 2 2 0.5 t=5 0.4 0.38 0.36 0.26
t=6 0 0 0 0.8 t=6 2 2 2 0.5 t=6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.28
t=7 0 0.01 0 0.84 t=7 2 2 2 0.5 t=7 0.4 0.38 0.4 0.26
t=8 0 0.01 0.04 0.76 t=8 2 2 2 0.5 t=8 0.4 0.38 0.36 0.28
t=9 0 0 0.12 0.96 t=9 2 2 2 0.5 t=9 0.4 0.4 0.28 0.24
t=10 0 0 0.44 0.52 t=10 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=10 0.3 0.3 0.28 0.26
t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - -
II. lamda=0.5, lamdaprime=0.5
h A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0 n A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0 ω A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0
t=1 0 0.02 0.2 1 t=1 2 2 2 0.5 t=1 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03
t=2 0 0 0.72 1 t=2 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=2 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03
t=3 0 0.08 0.92 1 t=3 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=3 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03
t=4 0 0.08 0.96 1 t=4 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=4 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03
t=5 0 0.06 0.96 1 t=5 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=5 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03
t=6 0 0.08 0.96 1 t=6 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=6 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03
t=7 0 0.09 0.96 1 t=7 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=7 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03
t=8 0 0.03 0.92 1 t=8 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=8 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03
t=9 0 0.04 1 1 t=9 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=9 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03
t=10 0 0 0.6 0.64 t=10 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=10 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.08
t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - -
III. lamda=2.0, lamdaprime=0.5
h A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0 n A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0 ω A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0
t=1 0.64 0.28 0.36 0.84 t=1 1 2 2 1 t=1 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
t=2 0.08 1 1 1 t=2 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=2 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
t=3 1 0.2 0.84 0.84 t=3 0.5 2 1 1 t=3 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
t=4 0.2 0.04 1 1 t=4 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=4 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03
t=5 1 0.16 0.84 0.84 t=5 0.5 2 1 1 t=5 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
t=6 0.16 0.04 1 1 t=6 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=6 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
t=7 1 0.12 0.84 0.84 t=7 0.5 2 1 1 t=7 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
t=8 0.04 0.08 1 1 t=8 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=8 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
t=9 0.2 0.32 0.84 0.84 t=9 2 2 1 1 t=9 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
t=10 0.04 0.76 0.84 0.84 t=10 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=10 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - -
IV. lamda=2.0, lamdaprime=2.0
h A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0 n A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0 ω A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0
t=1 0.2 0.28 0.04 0.48 t=1 2 2 2 1.5 t=1 0.2 0.1 0.35 0.05
t=2 0.08 0.04 1 1 t=2 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=2 0.3 0.35 0.2 0.2
t=3 1 0 1 0.8 t=3 0.5 2 0.5 1 t=3 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.05
t=4 0.08 0.92 0.2 1 t=4 2 0.5 2 0.5 t=4 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.2
t=5 0.08 0.2 0.56 0.8 t=5 2 1.5 1 1 t=5 0.3 0.25 0.15 0.05
t=6 0.2 1 1 1 t=6 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
t=7 0.16 1 0.72 0.8 t=7 2 0.5 1 1 t=7 0.25 0.2 0.1 0.05
t=8 0.16 0.96 0.92 1 t=8 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=8 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.2
t=9 0.16 0.76 0.8 0.8 t=9 2 1 1 1 t=9 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.05
t=10 0 0.8 0.8 0.8 t=10 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=10 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.05
t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - -  
Table 2-2 Transition Paths in Case B 
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Case B (Compensation but no saving economy)
(c) H1=10.0
I. lamda=0.5, lamdaprime=2.0
h A=1 A=2 A=3 A=4 n A=1 A=2 A=3 A=4 ω A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0
t=1 0.1 0.32 0.28 0.52 t=1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=1 0.44 0.4 0.4 0.34
t=2 0 0.28 0.24 0.52 t=2 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=2 0.4 0.4 0.42 0.34
t=3 0 0.28 0.2 0.52 t=3 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=3 0.4 0.4 0.42 0.34
t=4 0 0 0.24 0.52 t=4 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=4 0.4 0.4 0.42 0.34
t=5 0 0 0.24 0.52 t=5 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=5 0.4 0.4 0.42 0.34
t=6 0 0 0.12 0.52 t=6 2 2 1 0.5 t=6 0.4 0.4 0.38 0.34
t=7 0 0 0 0.52 t=7 2 2 2 0.5 t=7 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.34
t=8 0 0 0 0.52 t=8 2 2 2 0.5 t=8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.34
t=9 0 0 0 0.6 t=9 2 2 2 0.5 t=9 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.32
t=10 0 0 0 0.4 t=10 2 2 2 0.5 t=10 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.32
t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - -
II. lamda=0.5, lamdaprime=0.5
h A=1 A=2 A=3 A=4 n A=1 A=2 A=3 A=4 ω A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0
t=1 0.28 0.64 0.64 0.6 t=1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=1 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
t=2 0 0.28 0.64 0.24 t=2 2 0.5 0.5 1 t=2 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
t=3 0 0.28 0.64 0.48 t=3 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=3 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
t=4 0 0.16 0.64 0.64 t=4 2 1 0.5 0.5 t=4 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
t=5 0 0 0.64 0.72 t=5 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=5 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03
t=6 0 0 0.64 0.76 t=6 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=6 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03
t=7 0 0 0.64 0.76 t=7 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=7 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03
t=8 0 0 0.64 0.72 t=8 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=8 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03
t=9 0 0 0.72 0.84 t=9 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=9 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03
t=10 0 0 0.44 0.48 t=10 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=10 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07
t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - -
III. lamda=2.0, lamdaprime=0.5
h A=1 A=2 A=3 A=4 n A=1 A=2 A=3 A=4 ω A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0
t=1 0.06 0.24 0.5 0.32 t=1 2 2 1.5 2 t=1 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
t=2 0.06 0.16 0.08 0.1 t=2 2 2 2 2 t=2 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04
t=3 0.06 0.08 1 0.12 t=3 2 2 0.5 2 t=3 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
t=4 0 0.12 0.12 0.02 t=4 2 2 2 2 t=4 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04
t=5 0.06 0.68 0.14 0 t=5 2 1 2 2 t=5 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.05
t=6 0 0.1 0.04 1 t=6 2 2 2 0.5 t=6 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
t=7 0.06 1 0.16 0.22 t=7 2 0.5 2 2 t=7 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02
t=8 0 0.14 0.02 0.04 t=8 2 2 2 2 t=8 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04
t=9 0.06 0.2 0.16 0.3 t=9 2 2 2 2 t=9 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01
t=10 0 0 0.02 0.74 t=10 2 2 2 0.5 t=10 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - -
IV. lamda=2.0, lamdaprime=2.0
h A=1 A=2 A=3 A=4 n A=1 A=2 A=3 A=4 ω A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 A=10.0
t=1 0.1 0.85 1 1 t=1 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=1 0.3 0.25 0.225 0.225
t=2 0 0.7 1 1 t=2 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=2 0.4 0.3 0.225 0.225
t=3 0 0.7 1 1 t=3 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=3 0.4 0.3 0.225 0.225
t=4 0 0.35 1 1 t=4 2 1 0.5 0.5 t=4 0.4 0.275 0.225 0.225
t=5 0 0.2 1 1 t=5 2 1.5 0.5 0.5 t=5 0.4 0.275 0.225 0.225
t=6 0 0.1 1 1 t=6 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=6 0.4 0.3 0.225 0.225
t=7 0 0 1 1 t=7 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=7 0.4 0.4 0.225 0.225
t=8 0 0 0.8 0.8 t=8 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=8 0.4 0.4 0.275 0.275
t=9 0 0.2 0.7 0.75 t=9 2 2 1 1 t=9 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.075
t=10 0 0 0.75 0.75 t=10 2 2 0.5 0.5 t=10 0.1 0.1 0.075 0.075
t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - - t=11 - - - -  
Table 2-3 Transition Paths in Case B 
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Table 3  
Critical Values of Transition Process (T=3) in Case A and B 
 
Case A (i) (ii) 
­
=51AH  1.4 1.5 
­
=01HA  8.5 7.0 
¯
=101HA  2.8 2.8 
Case B I II III IV 
­
=51AH  1.5 2.25 0.0 1.0 
­
=01HA  8.5 6.5 5 8.5 
¯
=101HA  2.75 2.0 3.25 1.75 
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Altruistic Dynastic Utility Approach
(b) H1=0
I. lamda=0.5, lamdaprime=2.0
h A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 n A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 ω A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5
t=1 0 0.34 0.4 t=1 2 2 2 t=1 0.4 0.04 0
t=2 0 0.34 0.56 t=2 2 2 1.5 t=2 0.4 0.04 0
t=3 0 0.5 0.56 t=3 2 1.5 1.5 t=3 0.4 0.04 0
t=4 0 0.5 0.8 t=4 2 1.5 1 t=4 0.4 0.04 0.04
t=5 0 0.5 0.8 t=5 2 1.5 1 t=5 0.4 0.04 0.04
t=6 0 0.46 0.8 t=6 2 1.5 1 t=6 0.4 0.08 0.04
t=7 0 0.46 0.8 t=7 2 1.5 1 t=7 0.4 0.08 0.04
t=8 0 0.5 0.8 t=8 2 1 1 t=8 0.4 0.2 0.04
t=9 0 0.5 0.68 t=9 2 1 1 t=9 0.4 0.2 0.12
t=10 0 0.42 0.48 t=10 2 0.5 0.5 t=10 0.3 0.32 0.28
t=11 - - - t=11 - - - t=11 - - -
II. lamda=0.5, lamdaprime=0.5
h A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 n A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 ω A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5
t=1 0 0.36 0.4 t=1 2 2 2 t=1 0.05 0.01 0
t=2 0 0.84 0.88 t=2 2 1 1 t=2 0.05 0.01 0
t=3 0 0.84 0.88 t=3 2 1 1 t=3 0.05 0.01 0
t=4 0 0.84 0.88 t=4 2 1 1 t=4 0.05 0.01 0
t=5 0 0.84 0.88 t=5 2 1 1 t=5 0.05 0.01 0
t=6 0 0.8 0.88 t=6 2 1 1 t=6 0.05 0.01 0
t=7 0 0.8 0.84 t=7 2 1 1 t=7 0.05 0.01 0.01
t=8 0 0.76 0.8 t=8 2 1 1 t=8 0.05 0.01 0.01
t=9 0 1 0.76 t=9 2 0.5 1 t=9 0.05 0.03 0.01
t=10 0 0.52 0.6 t=10 2 0.5 0.5 t=10 0.09 0.07 0.07
t=11 - - - t=11 - - - t=11 - - -
III. lamda=2.0, lamdaprime=0.5
h A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 n A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 ω A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5
t=1 0.4 0.4 0.4 t=1 2 2 2 t=1 0 0 0
t=2 0.4 0.4 0.88 t=2 2 2 1 t=2 0 0 0
t=3 0.4 0.88 0.88 t=3 2 1 1 t=3 0 0 0
t=4 0.4 0.88 0.88 t=4 2 1 1 t=4 0 0 0
t=5 0.4 0.88 0.88 t=5 2 1 1 t=5 0 0 0
t=6 0.4 0.88 0.88 t=6 2 1 1 t=6 0 0 0
t=7 0.4 0.88 0.88 t=7 2 1 1 t=7 0 0 0
t=8 0.56 0.88 0.88 t=8 1.5 1 1 t=8 0 0 0
t=9 0.88 0.88 0.88 t=9 1 1 1 t=9 0 0 0
t=10 0.76 0.8 0.84 t=10 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=10 0.02 0.01 0.01
t=11 - - - t=11 - - - t=11 - - -
IV. lamda=2.0, lamdaprime=2.0
h A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 n A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5 ω A=2.5 A=5.0 A=7.5
t=1 0.4 0.4 0.4 t=1 2 2 2 t=1 0 0 0
t=2 0.4 0.4 0.88 t=2 2 2 1 t=2 0 0 0.01
t=3 0.4 0.88 0.88 t=3 2 1 1 t=3 0 0.01 0.01
t=4 0.4 0.88 0.88 t=4 2 1 1 t=4 0 0.01 0.01
t=5 0.4 0.88 0.88 t=5 2 1 1 t=5 0 0.01 0.01
t=6 0.4 0.88 0.88 t=6 2 1 1 t=6 0 0.01 0.01
t=7 0.88 0.88 0.88 t=7 1 1 1 t=7 0.01 0.01 0.01
t=8 0.88 0.88 0.88 t=8 1 1 1 t=8 0.01 0.01 0.01
t=9 0.88 0.88 0.88 t=9 1 1 1 t=9 0.01 0.01 0.01
t=10 0.68 0.76 0.8 t=10 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=10 0.1 0.06 0.05
t=11 - - - t=11 - - - t=11 - - -  
Table 4 Transition Paths in Altruistic Dynastic Utility 
Case B (Compensation but no saving) 
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Effect of Social Security Tax
Case C (Both Saving and Conpensation Economy)
(a) A=5
(1) lamda=1.0, lamdaprime=1.0, θ=0.0
h H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5 n H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5 ω H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5
t=1 0 0.7 0.8 t=1 2 1 1 t=1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4
t=2 0 1 1 t=2 2 0.5 0.5 t=2 0.2 0.1 0.1
t=3 0.1 1 1 t=3 2 0.5 0.5 t=3 0.1 0.1 0.1
t=4 0.2 1 1 t=4 2 0.5 0.5 t=4 0.1 0.1 0.1
t=5 0.7 0.7 0.7 t=5 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=5 0.1 0.1 0.1
t=6 - - - t=6 - - - t=6 - - -
s H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5
t=1 0 0 0
t=2 0 0 0
t=3 0 0 0
t=4 0 0 0
t=5 0 0 0
t=6 - - -
(1) lamda=1.0, lamdaprime=1.0, θ=0.4
h H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5 n H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5 ω H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5
t=1 0.3 0.3 1 t=1 2 1.5 0.5 t=1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5
t=2 0.3 1 1 t=2 1.5 0.5 0.5 t=2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5
t=3 1 1 1 t=3 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
t=4 1 1 1 t=4 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
t=5 0.6 0.6 0.6 t=5 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
t=6 - - - t=6 - - - t=6 - - -
s H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5
t=1 0 0 0
t=2 0 0 0
t=3 0 0 0
t=4 0 0 0
t=5 0 0 0
t=6 - - -
(2) lamda=1.0, lamdaprime=0.0, θ=0.0
h H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5 n H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5 ω H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5
t=1 0.7 0.5 0.5 t=1 1 1.5 1.5 t=1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
t=2 0.9 1 1 t=2 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=2 0 0 0
t=3 0.6 0.6 0.6 t=3 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=3 0 0 0
t=4 0.7 0.7 0.7 t=4 1 1 1 t=4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
t=5 0.7 0.7 0.7 t=5 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=5 0.1 0.1 0.1
t=6 - - - t=6 - - - t=6 - - -
s H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5
t=1 0 0 0
t=2 0 0 0
t=3 0.1 0.1 0.1
t=4 0 0 0
t=5 0 0 0
t=6 - - -  
Table 5-1 Effects of Social Security Tax 
Case C (Both saving and compensation) 
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(2) lamda=1.0, lamdaprime=0.0, θ=0.4
h H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5 n H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5 ω H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5
t=1 0 0.3 1 t=1 2 1.5 0.5 t=1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
t=2 0.1 1 1 t=2 2 0.5 0.5 t=2 0 -0.5 -0.5
t=3 1 1 1 t=3 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=3 -0.2 -0.5 -0.5
t=4 1 1 1 t=4 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
t=5 0.6 0.6 0.6 t=5 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
t=6 - - - t=6 - - - t=6 - - -
s H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5
t=1 0 0 0
t=2 0 0 0
t=3 0 0 0
t=4 0 0 0
t=5 0 0 0
t=6 - - -
(3) lamda=0.0, lamdaprime=1.0, θ=0.0
h H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5 n H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5 ω H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5
t=1 0 0 0 t=1 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
t=2 0 0 0 t=2 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=2 0.2 0.2 0.2
t=3 0 0 0 t=3 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=3 0.2 0.2 0.2
t=4 0 0 0 t=4 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=4 0.2 0.2 0.2
t=5 0 0 0 t=5 2 2 2 t=5 0.5 0.5 0.5
t=6 - - - t=6 - - - t=6 - - -
s H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5
t=1 0 0 0
t=2 0 0 0
t=3 0 0 0
t=4 0 0 0
t=5 0 0 0
t=6 - - -
(3) lamda=0.0, lamdaprime=1.0, θ=0.4
h H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5 n H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5 ω H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5
t=1 0 0 0 t=1 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.5
t=2 0 0 0 t=2 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=2 0.2 0.2 0.2
t=3 0 0 0 t=3 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=3 0.2 0.2 0.2
t=4 0 0 0 t=4 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=4 0.2 0.2 0.2
t=5 0.4 0.4 0.4 t=5 0.5 0.5 0.5 t=5 0.4 0.4 0.4
t=6 - - - t=6 - - - t=6 - - -
s H1=0 H1=2.5 H1=5
t=1 0 0 0
t=2 0 0 0
t=3 0 0 0
t=4 0 0 0
t=5 0 0 0
t=6 - - -  
Table 5-2 Effects of Social Security Tax 
Case C (Both saving and compensation) 
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Effect of Social Security Tax
Case C (Both Saving and Conpensation Economy)
(b) H1=0.0
(1) lamda=1.0, lamdaprime=1.0, θ=0.0
h A=2 A=8 n A=2 A=8 ω A=2 A=8 s A=2 A=8
t=1 0 0.3 t=1 2 2 t=1 -0.2 -0.3 t=1 0 0
t=2 0 1 t=2 2 0.5 t=2 0.2 0.1 t=2 0 0
t=3 0 1 t=3 2 0.5 t=3 0.2 0.1 t=3 0 0.1
t=4 0 0.8 t=4 2 1 t=4 0.2 -0.2 t=4 0 0
t=5 0 0.7 t=5 2 0.5 t=5 0.2 0.1 t=5 0 0
t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - -
(1) lamda=1.0, lamdaprime=1.0, θ=0.4
h A=2 A=8 n A=2 A=8 ω A=2 A=8 s A=2 A=8
t=1 0.1 0.7 t=1 2 1 t=1 -0.2 -0.3 t=1 0 0
t=2 0.5 1 t=2 1 0.5 t=2 -0.4 -0.5 t=2 0 0
t=3 0.2 1 t=3 1.5 0.5 t=3 -0.5 -0.5 t=3 0 0
t=4 0.9 1 t=4 0.5 0.5 t=4 -0.5 -0.5 t=4 0 0
t=5 0.5 0.7 t=5 0.5 0.5 t=5 -0.5 -0.5 t=5 0 0
t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - -
(2) lamda=1.0, lamdaprime=0.0, θ=0.0
h A=2 A=8 n A=2 A=8 ω A=2 A=8 s A=2 A=8
t=1 0 0.3 t=1 2 2 t=1 -0.4 -0.4 t=1 0 0
t=2 0 0.7 t=2 2 1 t=2 0 0 t=2 0 0
t=3 0 1 t=3 2 0.5 t=3 0 0 t=3 0 0
t=4 0.1 0.7 t=4 2 1 t=4 0 0 t=4 0 0
t=5 0.6 0.7 t=5 0.5 0.5 t=5 0.1 0.1 t=5 0 0
t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - -
(2) lamda=1.0, lamdaprime=0.0, θ=0.4
h A=2 A=8 n A=2 A=8 ω A=2 A=8 s A=2 A=8
t=1 0.1 0.8 t=1 2 1 t=1 -0.4 -0.4 t=1 0 0
t=2 0.6 1 t=2 1 0.5 t=2 -0.5 -0.5 t=2 0 0
t=3 0.2 1 t=3 1.5 0.5 t=3 -0.5 -0.5 t=3 0 0
t=4 0.9 1 t=4 0.5 0.5 t=4 -0.5 -0.5 t=4 0 0
t=5 0.5 0.7 t=5 0.5 0.5 t=5 -0.5 -0.5 t=5 0 0
t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - -
(3) lamda=0.0, lamdaprime=1.0, θ=0.0
h A=2 A=8 n A=2 A=8 ω A=2 A=8 s A=2 A=8
t=1 0 0 t=1 0.5 0.5 t=1 -0.1 -0.1 t=1 0 0
t=2 0 0 t=2 0.5 0.5 t=2 0.2 0.2 t=2 0 0
t=3 0 0 t=3 0.5 0.5 t=3 0.2 0.2 t=3 0 0
t=4 0 0 t=4 0.5 0.5 t=4 0.2 0.2 t=4 0 0
t=5 0 0 t=5 2 2 t=5 0.5 0.5 t=5 0 0
t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - -
(3) lamda=0.0, lamdaprime=1.0, θ=0.4
h A=2 A=8 n A=2 A=8 ω A=2 A=8 s A=2 A=8
t=1 0 0 t=1 0.5 0.5 t=1 -0.1 -0.1 t=1 0 0
t=2 0 0 t=2 0.5 0.5 t=2 0.2 0.2 t=2 0 0
t=3 0 0 t=3 0.5 0.5 t=3 0.2 0.2 t=3 0 0
t=4 0 0 t=4 0.5 0.5 t=4 0.2 0.2 t=4 0 0
t=5 0 0.5 t=5 2 0.5 t=5 0.5 0.5 t=5 0 0
t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - -
 
Table 5-3 Effects of Social Security Tax 
Case C (Both saving and compensation) 
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Effect of Social Security Tax
Case C (Both Saving and Conpensation Economy)
(c) H1=10.0
(1) lamda=1.0, lamdaprime=1.0, θ=0.0
h A=1 A=3 n A=1 A=3 ω A=1 A=3 s A=1 A=3
t=1 0.7 1 t=1 0.5 0.5 t=1 -0.3 -0.3 t=1 0.1 0
t=2 0 1 t=2 2 0.5 t=2 -0.3 0.1 t=2 0.1 0
t=3 0 1 t=3 2 0.5 t=3 -0.5 0.1 t=3 0 0
t=4 0 1 t=4 2 0.5 t=4 0.2 0.1 t=4 0 0
t=5 0 0.6 t=5 2 0.5 t=5 0.2 0.1 t=5 0 0
t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - -
(1) lamda=1.0, lamdaprime=1.0, θ=0.4
h A=1 A=3 n A=1 A=3 ω A=1 A=3 s A=1 A=3
t=1 0.1 0.9 t=1 2 0.5 t=1 -0.5 -0.5 t=1 0 0
t=2 0 0.9 t=2 2 0.5 t=2 -0.2 -0.5 t=2 0 0
t=3 0 0.9 t=3 2 0.5 t=3 0.2 -0.5 t=3 0 0
t=4 0 1 t=4 2 0.5 t=4 0.2 -0.5 t=4 0 0
t=5 0 0.6 t=5 2 0.5 t=5 0.2 -0.5 t=5 0 0
t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - -
(2) lamda=1.0, lamdaprime=0.0, θ=0.0
h A=1 A=3 n A=1 A=3 ω A=1 A=3 s A=1 A=3
t=1 0.6 1 t=1 0.5 0.5 t=1 -0.5 -0.5 t=1 0.1 0.1
t=2 0 1 t=2 2 0.5 t=2 -0.5 -0.1 t=2 0.1 0
t=3 0 1 t=3 2 0.5 t=3 -0.5 0 t=3 0 0
t=4 0 1 t=4 2 0.5 t=4 0 0 t=4 0 0
t=5 0 0.6 t=5 2 0.5 t=5 0.1 0.1 t=5 0 0
t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - -
(2) lamda=1.0, lamdaprime=0.0, θ=0.4
h A=1 A=3 n A=1 A=3 ω A=1 A=3 s A=1 A=3
t=1 0 0.2 t=1 2 1.5 t=1 -0.5 -0.5 t=1 0.1 0
t=2 0 0.1 t=2 2 2 t=2 -0.5 -0.5 t=2 0 0
t=3 0 0 t=3 2 2 t=3 0 -0.5 t=3 0 0.1
t=4 0 0.1 t=4 2 2 t=4 0 -0.3 t=4 0 0
t=5 0 0 t=5 2 2 t=5 0.1 0.1 t=5 0 0
t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - -
(3) lamda=0.0, lamdaprime=1.0, θ=0.0
h A=1 A=3 n A=1 A=3 ω A=1 A=3 s A=1 A=3
t=1 0 0 t=1 0.5 0.5 t=1 -0.2 -0.2 t=1 0 0
t=2 0 0 t=2 0.5 0.5 t=2 0.2 0.2 t=2 0 0
t=3 0 0 t=3 0.5 0.5 t=3 0.2 0.2 t=3 0 0
t=4 0 0 t=4 0.5 0.5 t=4 0.2 0.2 t=4 0 0
t=5 0 0 t=5 2 2 t=5 0.5 0.5 t=5 0 0
t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - -
(3) lamda=0.0, lamdaprime=1.0, θ=0.4
h A=1 A=3 n A=1 A=3 ω A=1 A=3 s A=1 A=3
t=1 0 0 t=1 0.5 0.5 t=1 -0.5 -0.5 t=1 0 0
t=2 0 0 t=2 0.5 0.5 t=2 0.2 0.2 t=2 0 0
t=3 0 0 t=3 0.5 0.5 t=3 0.2 0.2 t=3 0 0
t=4 0 0 t=4 0.5 0.5 t=4 0.2 0.2 t=4 0 0
t=5 0 0 t=5 2 2 t=5 0.5 0.5 t=5 0 0
t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - - t=6 - -
 
Table 5-4 Effects of Social Security Tax 
Case C (Both saving and compensation) 
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Figure 2 Specification of Intergenerational Linkage 
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Figure 2 Specification of Intergenerational Linkage (Cont’d) 
 
Case C 
O 
Y O 
C Y O 
C Y O 
t t+2 t+1 t+3 
1-ts  
tw  
tt hn ,  
ts  
1+tw  
1+ts  
11 , ++ tt hn  2+tw  
2+ts  
22 , ++ tt hn  3+tw  
 64 
BSl )1(:1 jj -=  
S’(R’) 
x y 
H 
I 
L 
')1(:"1 kSBl =-- jj  
K 
z 
kBSl =-- )1(:'1 jj  S(R) 
O B(P) 
c 
d 
a 
O” 
Ap
O’ 
l2 : S = -B
b 
e 
f 
F 
G 
D 
J 
E 
X p  X ac  
Z' 
Q 
Figure 3 
Intra-family & Inter-generational 
Transfer and Unfunded Social 
Security 
 
B’(P’) 
 65 
Appendix 1- Equilibrium conditions in stagnant/growth steady states for case A and B 
In these two states, I require just the following stationary conditions: 
( ) ( )VVt = , ( ) ( )11 ++ = HH t , ( ) ( )22 ++ = HH t , ( ) ( )sst = , ( ) ( )nnt = , 
( ) ( )ww =t , ( ) ( )11 ++ = sst , ( ) ( )11 ++ = nnt , ( ) ( )11 ++ = wwt  etc. 
Case A 
Stagnant equilibrium 
In a stagnant equilibrium, (4.3) can be rewritten as: 
s : { } sss d /1111 )()(]1[ +---£--- mmsmDshnvn    (A1.1a) 
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Growth equilibrium 
On the other hand, assume that the economy is in a growth equilibrium.  Then, under 
condition (x), (4.3) are reduced to: 
s : Same as stagnant eq.     (A1.1a) 
H : 
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Case B 
Stagnant equilibrium 
Under condition (i), (5.2) can be rewritten as: 
w : { } nnhnvn wdlw se /1']1[ -£---    (A1.4a) 
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Growth equilibrium 
On the other hand, assume that the economy is in a growth equilibrium.  Then, under 
condition (x), (5.2) are reduced to: 
w : Same as stagnant equilibrium.    (A1.4a) 
H : 
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Appendix 2- Some aspects of dynastic utility approach 
 At first I construct a simple dynastic utility, according to Becker et al. (1990). 
T
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t
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(A2.1) 
Abbreviating notation T  just for simplicity, TtV  and TtV 1+  can be replaced with tV  and 
1+tV , respectively. Here e-º nna )( )10( ££ e .  
 
Dynastic equilibrium conditions of a simple dynastic utility maximizer 
Assuming that production function is linear ( 1=g ) with human capital, and human capital 
market is fully competitive ( 1=tw ), and the economy is in “dynamic consistency” ( 1'¹ll ),  
a simple dynastic utility maximizer requires the following first order equilibrium conditions 
to hold for all t :51 
1+tw : { } 0)(')()(' 121,11111,22 =-+ ++++ ttttttt HcunnaHncu plppdp  (A2.2) 
                                                   
51 In this dynastic framework, the first order conditions are calculated for 1+tH  and 1+tN  (and 1+tw , 
ts ), not th  and tn , because th  and tn  have strategic effects in dynastic utility for infinitely 
descendant generations. 
 68 
1+tH : 
{ }
{ }
0)()('
)1()('
)(
)(')('
12,22
21111,1
1
111,22,1
£
úúû
ù
êêë
é
+
---+
+÷ø
öçè
æ-
++
++++
++
m
tt
tttt
tt
ttttt
sDcu
svncu
nna
ncunAcu
dp
pwrlp
pwdpV
  (A2.3) 
with equality if 01 >+tH  ( 0>th ) 
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with equality if 01 >+tN  ( 0>tn ) 
 ts : { } { } 0)()()(')()(' 11,22,1 £+++- -+ mttttt smHHDcuHHcu dpr  (A2.5) 
with equality if 0>ts  
 
Note that F.O.C. for 1+tH  (human capital) and 1+tN  (fertility) prevail over three adjacent 
periods, not two. Thus (A2.2), (A2.3) and (A2.5) can be rewritten as: 
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Assume 0=D (i.e., 01 == +tt ss ). Then from (A2.2-a): 
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From (A2.3-a):  
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Two steady states 
Stagnant equilibrium 
In a stagnant equilibrium, 11,1,1 ccc tt º= + , 21,2,2 ccc tt º= +  and 
HAhHAhHH tt º-== + )1/(1 .52 Then (A2.2), (A2.3), (A2.4) and (A2.5) are equivalent 
with: 
w : d
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52 Therefore, )1/( AhHHH -=+ . 
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Now assume, for simplicity, condition (y): 121 == pp , nna /1)( =  )0.1( =e  and 
1=== gVr .53 Then (A2.2,3,4,5-b) can be rewritten as: 
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mll     (A2.3-c) 
N : 0)1( £þý
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Dmsml       (A2.5-c) 
  
Growth equilibrium 
On the other hand, in a growth equilibrium, tt AhHH =+1  ( HH t >> ), 
1,11,1 AhcAhcc tt ==+ , 2,21,2 AhcAhcc tt ==+ . Then (A2.2,3,4,5-b)  are reduced to: 
w : sd
l -= )()()('
)('
1
2 Ahnacu
cu  or 
 ]1[)(][ 2
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1 wprVd
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s
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îí
ì=+
-
shnvnAhnaDsnAh m   (A2.2-d) 
H : 1])()()1[())(( 21 £+-- -- Vplrlp
ss ADsnaAhsvnAhna m  (A2.3-d) 
                                                   
53 0.1=e denotes perfect inelasticity of altruism per child. 
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         (A2.4-d) 
s : 1)()(
1
2 £
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r
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Under condition (y), 
w : ]1[][ wl
dw ----÷ø
öçè
æ=+ shnvnAhnDsnAh m   (A2.2-e) 
H : 1])1[( £+-- mDsAhnsvnnh
ll     (A2.3-e) 
N : 0)1( £þý
ü
îí
ì -+-- nhv
lwl     (A2.4-e)54 
s : 1
1
£
-
Ahn
Dmsml       (A2.5-e) 
For example, it is easily seen, from (A2.6), that, in case of 0=D , a steady state could be in a 
growth equilibrium, if: 
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Proposition A2-1: Assume that condition (y) is satisfied and that fertility decision is fixed at 
n . If the economy is in a stagnant equilibrium, then 0=h  and the following condition is 
satisfied: 
                                                   
54 This is the same as (A2.4-c). For 1¹s , (7-3-e) is replaced with: 
N : [ ] 0)()(1 11 £þýüîíì -+-- -- ss lwl AhnhvAh  
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Proposition A2-2: Assume that condition (y) is satisfied and that fertility decision is fixed at 
n . If the economy is in a growth equilibrium, then the solution of the following equation, 
1)1()1( )1/(1
)1/(1
=úúû
ù
êêë
é
÷÷ø
ö
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-
m
mm
xA
Dmmnvx  where nhx
lº  )( nxh
l= , 
satisfies 1)/()( >nxAl  )1( >Ah . 
Proposition A2-3: (Rate of return in saving and bearing children) 
In a stagnant steady state:  hnvn
nDsm
V
wp
r +³
-
1
1
 
In a growth steady state: hnvn
nAhDsm
V
wp
r +³
-
1
1
 
In both cases: hnvn
m
V
rlwp
+³
11  
With equality in both states, if the economy is infinitely egoistic, 0®l . 
Proposition A2-4: Assume 0.1=e , in which the generation holds perfectly inelastic altruism 
with number of child. Then the fertility n  is at the corner solution if 1>l , but at the 
interior solution if 1<l . 
 
Appendix 3- Supplementary explanation regarding short-run aspects of intra-family & 
inter-generational transfer and unfunded social security 
In this appendix, I explain, using Figure 3 and on the basis of results obtained in Aoki (2007), 
some short-run aspects of intra-family & inter-generational transfer and unfunded social 
security, all of which support proposition 9-2 and corollary 9-1 to 4.   
In Figure 3, )(RS  and )(PB  axes, beginning from original point O , denote support 
(receipt) and bequest (payment) between old parents and young adult children under no 
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certainty premium transferred between the generations. zdca ,,,  are indifference curves 
of old parents’ indirect utility regarding insurance contract under their mortality risk, and  
feb ,,  are those of young adult children. The contract curve, which satisfy both Pareto 
optimality and participation constraints with no actuarially fair insurance available, is GF , 
and the self-insuring contract curve with no intra-family risk sharing available is DJ . 
Assume that a fixed level of mandatory certainty premium transfer from young children to 
old parents, 'OO , takes place. Then corresponding to new original point and axes 'O , 
)'(' RS  and )'(' PB , DJ  move to IK  on line x , and GF  does to LH  on y , 
respectively. From lemmas 1 and 2 of Aoki (2007), the slopes of line x  and y  prove to be 
less than -1. This aspect also proves corollary 9-1 to 5, as well as proposition 2. For example, 
corollary 9-3 is derived by observing ODIO >'' . 
 
 
